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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Antitrust Laws 
1. Origins and Theory 
Of singular import in this country's rise to international 
prominence has been a phenomenal rate of economic growth ac-
companied by an unparalleled utilization of material resources. 
Many factors have converged to occasion our present condition 
of affiuence.1 In fact, the historical influences have been so 
varied and diverse as to render impossible any attempt to iden-
tify a single sufficient cause explicatory of our economic success. 
Efficient causes, on the other hand, are discernible.2 And, of 
these, none has proven more significant in our unique experience 
than the operation of the principle of competition in open mar-
kets.3 
Very early in American history, the application of the laissez 
faire doctrine in a predominantly rural society led to the accept-
ance of competition as the economic and social basis of an indivi-
dual-centered society. In fact, laissez faire became, through the 
"Protestant Ethic," a code of positive morality.4 The successful 
man was the moral man. To be poor was to be immoral, even 
sinful. 
Self-assertion, of course, meant competition, for others sought 
the same and similar objectives. Economic success, that is, the 
outselling of one's competitors, required efficient production, low 
prices, and high quality products. Through competition, the great 
teaching of classical economics was realized, that "by serving 
ourselves, we serve all." 5 
In classical theory, government had little role to play in the 
operation of the economic mechanism. Indeed, a kind of natural 
law, anthropomorphized by early economists in the form of an 
"unseen hand," was regarded as entirely sufficient for regulatory 
1, See generally Galbraith, The Affluent Society (1960). 
2. The terms are employed in their ordinary social science meaning. 
3. "The heart of national economic policy has long been faith in the 
value of competition," Standard Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 
(1951). 
4. See Maurer, Great Enterprise 25-39 (1955). 
5, Cf. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees (1714), 
1 
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purposes. 6 The theory of passive government, although accept-
able in an agrarian society, proved incompatible with the rise of 
industry. Unrestrained competition led to single-firm domina-
tion; and with accelerating advances in transportation and com-
munication, the control of supply approach nationwide dimensions. 
With no one left with whom to compete, business efficiency was 
no longer imperative, prices soared, and quality deteriorated. 
The mandate for government action was clear. In order to 
preserve competition from its own self-destructive characteris-
tics, 7 legislation was necessary to "maintain" or "regulate" 
competition as the basis of economic life. 8 Thus, through the 
adoption of the antitrust laws, government, previously passive, 
assumed a positive role in achieving the economic objectives 
of society. 
2. Statutes and Their Enforcement 9 
The basic statute of our federal antitrust complex is the 
Sherman Act lO of 1890. Described as a "charter of economic 
freedom,"11 the Act declares every "contract, combination and 
conspiracy . . . in restraint or' interstate and foreign commerce 
to be illegal as a misdemeanor,12 and further provides that 
every person who shall "monopolize or attempt to monopolize" 
or combine or "conspire" with others to monopolize such inter-
state or foreign trade will be guilty of a misdemeanor. 13 In 
addition to the authority to impose fines and/or order imprison-
ment, the courts are invested with injunctive powers to prevent 
continued violation. The Antitrust Division of the Department 
of Justice administers the Act. 
6. See Soule, Ideas of the Great Economists 30-52 (1952). See gen-
erally Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776). 
7. See Generally Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination 
of an American Tradition (1955); and Wilcox, Public Policies Toward 
Business (1955). 
8. Cf. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Laws 18-19 (2d ed. 1959), where 
the terms "maintained" and "regulated" competition are employed. 
9. No attempt is made to present an exhaustive treatment of the 
federal antitrust laws. For an anlysis that is both detailed and con-
structive, see the Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. (1955), 
10. 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 u.s.c. §§ 1-8 (1890). 
11. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359, 53 
S. Ct. 471, 479 (1933). 
12. § 1. 
13. § 2. 
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In 1914 two other statutes were added to the antitrust ar-
senal.14 These were the Federal Trade Commission Actl5 and 
the Clayton Act.16 Though the former is not exclusively an anti-
trust statute, section 5 has that effect in declaring unlawful "un-
fair methods of competition" in interstate commerce. Under the 
section, the Federal Trade Commission is directed to combat 
both "full blown and incipient menaces to competition." 17 Its 
orders to "cease and desist from using such method[s] of com-
petition or such act(s] or practice[s]" are buttressed by fines 
recoverable by the government in civil actions in the federal 
courts. 
The antitrust provisions of the Clayton Act are sections 3, 
7, and 8. Section 3 is concerned with exclusive arrangements 
and tying clauses. Section 7 covers acquisitions by a corporation 
of the whole or any part of the stock or assets of another cor-
poration. Section 8 deals with interlocking directorates. When-
ever any of the above activities by persons or businesses "may 
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a mon-
opoly," the Federal Trade Commission is charged with the auth-
ority to enforce compliance with the Act by restoring competitive 
conditions.18 The Department of Justice may also assume juris-
diction under the Act when the public interest requires and is 
under duty to do so where criminal violations occur.19 The juris-
diction of the two enforcing agencies over Clayton Act violations 
is thus concurrent. 20 
In addition to "cease and desist orders" and the possibility 
of a divestiture order breaking up an illegal merger (govern-
mental remedies), enforcement of antitrust objectives is further-
ed by provision for treble damage and injunction actions by parties 
injured by the proscribed activities. 
The objectives of the three core statutes described above, 
as well as the role that their enforcement has played in the 
14. The three statutes are not the only federal antitrust laws. 
Mention should also be made of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 
1526, 15 u.s.c. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1936); the Miller-Tydings 
Act, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U. s. C. § 1 (1955); and the McGuire Act, 
66 Stat. 632, 15 u.s.c. § 45 (1958). 
15. 38 Stat. 717, as amended, 15 u.s.c. §§ 41-51 (1938). 
16. 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 15 u. s. c. § § 12-27, 29 u. s. C. § 52 
(1914). 
17. Oppenheim, supra note 8, at 18. 
18. See generally Elkouri, Trade Regulation 14 (1957). 
19. See generally Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 374-77 (1955). 
20. See Kintner, An Antitrust Primer 25-26 (1965). 
4 INVESTIGATION AND DISCOVERY 
phenomenal successes of this country in the current century, were 
well stated in the Report of the Attorney General's Committee: 
The general objective of the antitrust laws is promotion of compet-
ition in open markets. This policy is a primary feature of private en-
terprise. Most Americans have long recognized that opportunity for 
market access and fostering of market rivalry are basic tenets of our 
faith in competition as a form of economic organization. 
Antitrust is a distinctive American means for assuring the compet-
itive economy on which our political and social freedom under represen-
tative government in part depend. These laws have helped release en-
ergies essential to our leadership in industrial productivity and techno-
logical development. They reinforce our ideal of careers open to su-
perior skills and talent, a crucial index of a free society. As a result, 
the essentials of antitrust are today proclaimed by both political parties 
as necessary to assure economic opportunity and some limitation on 
economic power incompatible with the maintenance of competitive con-
ditions. 21 
Over the years antitrust enforcement has undergone periods 
of extreme ebb and flow. The electrical equipment cases22 illus-
trate the results of the vigorous enforcement policies of each of 
the two previous Assistant Attorneys General for Antitrust. 23 
Present Justice Department activity, however, appears to be ap-
proaching an all-time low, despite public activist pronouncements 
of the present Assistant Attorney General to the contrary. 24 In 
contrast to similar inactivity at ·the Federal Trade Commission, 
private enforcement activities in the way of treble damage actions 
are on the increase. 25 The rationale of active enforcement is the 
same by whatever agency it is brought: "competition is the coun-
terpart and corollary of economic freedom, and . . . a free eco-
nomy is necessarily a competitive economy." 26 
21. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 1-2 (1955). 
22. £!.. Goldstein, "The Tariff Is the Mother of Trusts," 39 Texas L. 
Rev. 711 nn. 4 & 5 (1961); Loevinger, "The New Frontier in Anti-
trust." 39 Texas L. Rev. 865, 866 (1961). 
23. See Loevinger. ibid., and Orrick. "Antitrust in the Great Society." 
27 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 26 (1965). 
24. Compare "Symposium," 30 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 100 (1966). with 
Wall St. J. • Vol. CLXIX, No. 2.9, p. 1. col. 6, Feb. 10, 1967. See, 
however, remarks of newly appointed Attorney General Clark, New 
York Times, p. 18C, col. 5, March 3, 1967. 
25. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 62 s. Ct. 972 (1942), to the 
effect that a state is a "person" within the meaning of the Clayton 
Act provision for the recovery of treble damages. 
26. Loevinger, supra note 22. 
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3. The Role of the States 
Though attention to antitrust in this century has been focused 
principally upon its federal aspect, the states as well, in varying 
degrees, have assumed functions in this regard. In fact state 
legislative activity predates its federal counterpart, as Kansas, 
Texas, Tennessee, and Michigan all adopted antitrust laws in 
1889, one year before the Sherman Act emerged from Congress. 27 
The concern of state legislatures with providing local pro-
cedures for the promotion of competition did not terminate with 
the various federal enactments. It is clear that the Sherman, 
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts have not preempted 
state action.28 The result is that at this date over four-fifths of 
the states have general antitrust laws providing for enforcement 
against restraints of trade and monopolization.29 Indeed, in some 
states prohibitions against restraint of trade and monopolization 
are included in their constitutions.30 
Variation in language, particularly in the coverage and ex-
emption provisions,31 require attention to specific statutes when 
a particular problem in a particular jurisdiction is at issue. 32 
Nevertheless, sufficient similarity is evinced-both in statutory 
terminology and in judicial interpretation (which ordinarily follows 
27. See Summary of Remarks of Mr. Wilson, First Natienal Conference 
on Consumer and Investor Protection 2 (1960). published by the 
Council of State Governments (hereafter cited as First National 
Conference). 
28. "[I]n the antitrust field, we have never had a doctrine of federal 
preemption. Antitrust has always been an area of federal-state 
concurrent jurisdiction." Summary of Remarks of Mr. Loevinger, 
Second National Conference on Consumer and Investor Protection 
4 (1961), published by the Council of State Governments (hereafter 
cited as Second National Conference). 
29. Rahl, "Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy," 39 Texas L. 
Rev. 753 (1961). 4 Trade Reg. Rep. ,r 30,000 et seq. collects all 
the state laws. Alaska, Delaware, Maryland, ~a. Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island have no general antitrust laws at 
this time; Georgia has a statute with no sanctions, and the New 
Jersey law applies only to mergers. -
30. Twenty-two states have constitutional provisions prohibiting 
restraints of trade and monopolization. See Sieker• "The Role of 
the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement-Some Views and Observa-
tions," 39 Texas L. Rev. 873, 878 (1961). 
31. E.g. • some states included "services" within the antitrust 
provisions. 
32. See generally 4 Trade Reg. Rep. ,r 30, 000 et seq. 
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that developed in regard to the federal laws)- 33 to justify certain 
general observations. Thus, the typical antitrust statute is mod-
eled more or less on the Sherman Act, with or without the more 
specific requirements of the Clayton Act alluded to above.34 What-
ever the statutory terminology, however, the objective seems uni-
formly the same-to guarantee the operation of competition in 
open markets. Illustrative is the Alabama statute which provides, 
inter alia, as follows: 
Any person or corporation who engages or agrees with other persons 
or corporations, or enters into, directly or indirectly, any combination, 
pool, trust, or confederation, to regulate or fix the price of any article 
or commodity to be sold or produced within this state, or any person or 
corporation, who enters into, becomes a member of, or party to, any 
pool agreement, combination, or confederation, to fix or limit the quan-
tity of any article or commodity to be produced, manufactured, mined 
or sold, in this state, must, on conviction, be fined not less than five 
hundred, nor more than two thousand dollars. 
Any person or corporation, domestic or foreign, which shall re-
strain or attempt to restrain the freedom of trade or production, or 
which shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize the production, control, 
or sale or any commodity, or the prosecution, management, or control 
of any kind, class, or description of business; or which shall destroy 
or attempt to destroy, competition in the manufacture or sale of a 
commodity, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall 
be fined not less than five hundred nor more than two thousand dollars 
for each offense. 35 
The statute is phrased in terms of criminal offense. As 
was indicated with regard to the federal laws, however, civil 
remedies likewise exist in the states to assist in enforcing anti-
trust laws. Thus, many states provide for private damage suits36 
33, E.g., People v. Building Maintenance Contractors' Ass'n, 41 Cal. 
2d 719, 264 P,2d 31 (1953); State v, Detroit Asphalt Paving Co., 
244 Mich. 119, 221 N. W. 122 (1928) (applying the "Rule of Reason"). 
34. The various categories of state laws are collected in Elkouri, 
supra note 18, at 16-18. 
35. Tit. 57, §§ 106 & 108 (1960). 
36. Approximately three-fifths of the states so provide. See Robinson, 
Tabulated Results of Answers to Questionnaire on State Antitrust 
Activity in 1957 (mimeo. ). 
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and some even allow forfeiture of corporate charters for viola-
tion. 37 
Ordinarily, but not universally, enforcement is confined to 
the state attorney general's office 38 or to damage suits by pri-
vate parties. Few states have any procedures for administra-
tive enforcement such as exists nationally under the jurisdiction 
of the Federal Trade Commission. 39 
On the other hand, the law in books does not necessarily 
coincide with the law in practice. Antitrust statutes are not 
self-executing. Staffs, money, and a desire to enforce statutor-
ily-guaranteed competition are rquired.40 And, in this regard, 
state activity has been noticeably deficient. As summarized by 
one observer: 
Among the states having general antitrust laws, only four have shown 
any degree of continuing enforcement activity over a substantial period of 
recent years. These are Missouri, New York, Texas and Wisconsin. 
Except for occasional appearance in private litigation, the laws in most 
of the remaining states have been comatose for many years. The Middle 
West, often regarded as the incubator of antitrust philosophy, has some 
of the most moribund states. There are no reported cases of state en-
forcement in the annotations in Illinois since 1905, in Minnesota since 
1914, in South Dakota since 1915, in Ohio since 1922, in Kansas since 
1923, in Indiana since 1926, in Nebraska since 1929, or in Michigan 
since 1933. There is no report of any case in Iowa or North Dakota. 
Of the thirty-five states reporting in the survey conducted by the New 
York State Bar Association Committee in 1956, only five reported any 
state cases since before World War n. 41 
Of late, however, the tempo of state antitrust activity has 
undergone a marked increase. Previously inactive states such 
as California, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington have 
recently entered the arena of enforcement, and Texas and Wis-
consin have quickened the pace of their already active antitrust 
endeavors. 42 Both the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
37. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1402 (1949). 
38. Local district attorneys may also be invested with enforcement 
jurisdiction. See chart: "State Antitrust Enforcement Officers, " 
pp. 37-38. 
39. Some states, however, do possess such agencies. See, e.g. , 
Wisconsin experience, reported in Appendix E. 
40. See generally Rahl, supra note 29, at 763-66. 
41. Id. at 753-54. --
42. See replies to Questionnaire, Appendix E. 
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Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have stressed, in this 
regard, the importance of increased state activity as a necessary 
complement to federal policy .43 Some of the reasons are as 
follows: 
First, there are important areas where state antitrust enforcement may 
be the only available remedy because of the purely intrastate nature of 
the practice or the failure of Congress to extend a particular facet of 
federal antitrust to the full constitutional limit. In other areas where 
jurisdiction is concurrent, the states may well be better equipped to treat 
restraints which, though affecting or in interstate commerce, are pri-
marily of local impact: the Department of Justice necessarily must give 
priority in assigning its limited manpower to practices affecting multi-
state markets. And in situations where the Department does bring an 
action, adequate local relief can sometimes be secured only by state au-
thorities acting under their own laws to correct local aspects of a more 
widespread combination. 
Vigorous state antitrust law enforcement thus appears necessary to 
insure the protection of the local market places of the states. At the 
same time, it is a valuable complement to the federal antitrust program, 
with benefits to the national competitive climate that are felt beyond state 
borders.44 
In addition, efforts are being made to coordinate federal and 
state enforcement procedures. 45 In this manner, the states may 
learn from federal experience, wasteful duplication is avoided, 
and, most important, through joint efforts a sound, overall anti-
trust policy may be forged, assuring the nation a sound and dur-
able economy. 46 
B. The Investigative Aspect 
The significance of adequate investigatory and discovery pro-
cedures to the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws-state 
or federal-is impossible to overstate. The acquisition of facts 
is, without question, the very basis of the enforcement process. 
43. See Remarks of Mr. Dixon and Mr. Loevinger, Second National 
Conference, supra note 28, at 3-6. 
44. Stern, "A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and Commen-
tary on a Draft Statute," 39 Texas L. Rev. 717-18 (1961). 
45. See Remarks of Attorney General Kennedy, Second National 
Conference, supra note 28, at 1-2. 
46. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 2 (1955). See also Remarks 
of Mr. Wilson, Second National Conference, ~ note 28, at 1. 
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As stated by the Attorney General's Committee: 
The inevitable generality of most statutory antitrust prohibitions ren-
ders facts of paramount importance. Accordingly, effective enforcement 
requires full and comprehensive investigation before formal proceedings, 
civil or criminal, are commenced. Incomplete investigation may mean 
proceedings not justified by more careful search and study, Public re-
treat by the prosecutor may then be difficult, if not impossible, and the 
result may be a futile trial exhausting the resources of the litigants and 
increasing court congestion. Thus the adequacy of investigatory processes 
can make or break any enforcement program. 47 
The quotation, though concerned with the federal laws, is 
equally applicable to state antitrust laws. Hence, pretrial in-
vestigatory procedures available in the enforcement of state 
antitrust objectives warrant particularized study. 
47, Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm, Antitrust Rep. 343-44 (1955). 
II. THE FEDERAL MODEL 
A. Dual Enforcement 
By way of introduction to the various state procedures, a 
brief description of their more familiar federal counterpart is 
valuable both in providing a focus for inquiry and in affording 
a basis for comparative evaluation. In addition, recent develop-
ments at the federal level appear instructive as to the direction 
that the stat.es might take in creating or reconstituting their 
respective discovery practices more adequately to accomplish 
such antitrust objectives as they may wish to pursue. 
As noted above, 48 federal enforcement is not confined to a 
single governmental body. Rather, the task is bifurcated be-
tween an independent regulatory agency (the Federal Trade Com-
mission) and a department of the executive branch (the Antitrust 
Division of Justice}. The resulting duality of authority, as might 
be expected, has necessitated a great deal of cooperation in in-
vestigating possible violations of the laws. 49 The "goal of 'ef-
ficient cooperation' through dual enforcement" was specifically 
endorsed by the Attorney General's Committee. 50 
B. Federal Trade Commission Investigations 
The Federal Trade Commision possesses extensive investi-
gatory powers. Illustratively, section 6(a} of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act accords the power: 
To gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate 
from time to time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and 
management of any corporation engaged in commerce, excepting banks 
and common carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce, and its 
relation to other corporations and to individuals, associations, and part-
nerships. 51 
48. See notes 9-20 supra and accompanying text. 
49. See Remarks of Mr. Dixon, Second National Conference, ~ 
note 28, at 8. 
50. Supra note 27, at 875. See also Chadwell, "Antitrust Administra-
tion and Enforcement," 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1133 (1955). 
51. Elkouri, Trade Regulation 32 (1957). 
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In effect, the section (in conjunction with sections 6(b)-(h) ) 
endows the Commission with investigatory and information-gather-
ing powers practically coextensive with the power of Congress 
to regulate interstate commerce. And, the power to investigate 
is well fortified with an impressive array of factfinding ma-
chinery. Access to records as well as extensive subpoena 
powers-both of persons and of records-are provided. Accord-
ing to section 9, the Commission: 
, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of 
examination, and the right to copy any documentary evidence of any corp-
oration being investigated or proceeded against; and the commission shall 
have power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of wit-
nesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to 
any matter under investigation, Any member of the commission may 
administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evi-
dence, 52 
As the statutory language discloses, the scope of the ad-
ministrative subpoena power is very broad. No requirement of 
probable cause exists to limit judicial enforcement of the sub-
poena, 53 and the defenses of irrelevancy 54 and unreasonableness 55 
have been all but destroyed by judicial decision. The practical 
effect is that "fishing expenditions" into private papers-once so 
universally abhorred by American jurisprudence56 -have become, 
with the maturity of the administrative process, acceptable prac-
tice. The investigatory power of the Commission may, indeed, 
be likened to that of a grand jury: 
Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until 
it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, it does not follow that 
an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced 
52. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.31-1.42 (1960). 
53 • .£!.. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U,S. 632, 70 s. Ct. 
357 (1950). 
54. See Civil Aeronautics Board v. Herman, 353 U.S. 322, 77 s. Ct. 
804 (1957). 
55, See generally Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 
Mich, L, Rev. 775, 784-89 (1953), 
56. "lt is contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search 
through all the respondent's records relevant or irrelevant in the 
hope that something will turn up. " Federal Trade Commission v. 
American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306, 44 s. Ct. 336, 337 
(1924), 
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may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. It has a power 
of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from 
the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does 
not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can 
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even 
just because it wants assurance that it is not. 57 
C. Justice Department Investigations 
1. Criminal Cases 
Where a criminal indictment is contemplated, the Justice 
Department possesses, through invocation of a grand jury, equ-
ally embracive investigatory powers. Thus: 
[ T]he federal grand jury is equipped with ample powers to permit the 
fullest investigation. The grand jury subpoena may be used to compel 
the discovery of all documentary material reasonably required as well 
as the testimony of witnesses under oath. 58 
In addition, preliminary inquiries may be made either by 
personnel of the Antitrust Division or by the FBI. Should the 
preliminary inquiry reveal information warranting more intensive 
scrutiny, the Department of Justice ordinarily orders a full-scale 
investigation by the FBI. 59 And, of course, if indictment is is-
sued, the discovery mechanism of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (Rule 17(c)) becomes available.60 
2. Civil Cases 
Civil investigation, on the other hand, was, until 1962, in-
sufficient to satisfy enforcement requirements. In such investi-
gation, the Department of Justice had three alternatives. 61 These 
were to: 
57. United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 53, at 642-43, 70 
S. Ct. 357, at 364. --
58. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 344 (1955). 
59. See generally Van Cise, Understanding the Antitrust Laws 128-30 
(1955). 
60. See generally "Developments in the Law-Discovery," 74 Harv. L. 
Rev. 940, 1053 (1961). 
61. An additional possibility, which, however, has never been utilized, 
is that by statute the Justice Department might request that the 
Federal Trade Commission conduct investigations for it. The use 
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(a) depend upon voluntary cooperation of those under investigation; 
(b) file a civil complaint and make use of the discovery processes 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; or 
(c) make use of the grand jury. 62 
Owing to the inadequacies of the first two possibilities and 
the essential unfairness of the third,63 Congress passed, in 
September of 1962, the long-awaited Civil Investigative Demand 
Bill.64 In essence, the Bill (reprinted as Appendix A) provides 
a precomplaint investigatory process for use where civil pro-
ceedings are originally contemplated and voluntary cooperation 
by those under investigation fails. The result is that the De-
partment of Justice may now require the production of an un-
privileged correspondence or business records of any party 
under investigation without having first to file a civil complaint 
or utilize the criminally-oriented grand jury procedure. 65 
Upon deciding to proceed with civil suit, the full battery of 
discovery processes under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(interrogatories, motions to produce documents, depositions, etc.) 
becomes available.66 (See Appendix B.) Such methods, also 
accessible to private parties in treble damage and injunction 
actions, "have been extensively used in antitrust cases and pro-
vide discovery powers almost as sweeping as a grand jury." 67 
Thus, the fact-acquiring machinery available to the Depart-
ment of Justice now approximates that available to the Federal 
Trade Commission. The provision for precomplaint investiga-
tion has afforded a necessary complement to postcomplaint (pre-
trial) discovery in the enforcement, on the civil side, of anti-
trust objectives. 
(Footnote continued) 
of this technique is limited because the authorization applies only to 
corporations, there is some question whether the Commission is 
under obligation to make the investigation requested, and the staff 
of the Commission investigators is already overburdened, See 
"Antitrust Civil Process Act," H,R. Rep. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 
2d Sess., 4 (1962). 
62. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 344 (1955). 
63. Id., at 344-45. 
64. For an analysis, see Perry & Simon, "The Civil Investigative 
Demand: New Fact-Finding Powers for the Antitrust Division," 
58 Mich. L. Rev. 855 (1960). 
65. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 344-45 (1955). 
66. Id. at 344 n. 1. 
67. Id. at 344. 
III. STATE PRETRIAL PROCEDURES 
A. In General 
Investigation and discovery in state antitrust enforcement 
have characteristics similar to those described with respect to 
federal practice. Thus, the distinction between precomplaint 
investigation and postcomplaint {but pretrial) discovery is evident 
at this level as well. All states provide, as incidents of their 
general adjective law, for some sort of discovery or factfinding 
machinery subsequent to the filing of a civil complaint or the 
issuance of a criminal indictment or information. Justice is 
thought to be best served by minimizing surprise and so-called 
lawyers' tricks in the trial of cases.68 Such, of course, applies 
as well to antitrust as to any other form of litigation; and once 
suit is commenced, the usual discovery procedures of the state 
come into operation to the same extent and with the same effect 
as in any other criminal or civil case. 
Precomplaint investigation, on the other hand, is not gener-
ally available under state procedure laws-at least on the civil 
side. Though in criminal investigations, the grand jury (as at 
the federal level) possesses extensive compulsory process powers, 
discovery in civil antitrust cases-in the absence of a special 
statute according subpoena or visitorial powers to the attorney 
general or some other state official-must await the filing of a 
complaint. Of course, voluntary cooperation of suspected viola-
tors might be solicited. But in the absence of such a special 
statute as mentioned above, no compulsory process is available. 
Analysis of such precomplaint visitorial laws as now exist, to-
gether with the arguments pro and con their employment, is 
presented later. 
68. "Mutual lmowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties 
is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may 
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. 11 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 s. Ct. 385, 392 (1947). 
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B. State Discovery Practice 
1. Criminal Cases 
15 
Assuming a state antitrust law with penal sanctions {fine 
and/ or imprisonment) 69 and a desire and ability (staff and 
money) 70 to effect enforcement, the question arises as to what 
factfinding apparatus is invocable to ferret out possible viola-
tions. In addition to whatever investigatory powers might be 
possessed by the attorneys general by virtue of a special sta-
tute, the ordinary criminal procedures of the state may be uti-
lized. The general criminal discovery provisions of the states 
(with references to the appropriate sections of the statutes) 
are summarized below. 
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY APPARATUS 
STATE CODE NO. SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS 
Alabama §§15:99-118 Procedure for issuance of search 
warrants 
§30:83 Grand· jury power of subpoena 
Alaska §§66-7-1 to Magistrate issues search warrant 
66-7-16 
§§66-8-21 Implicit recognition of grand jury 
power of subpoena 
Arizona §§13-1441 to Search warrant by magistrate 
13-1454 
Arkansas §43-911 Grand jury subpoena power 
§43-801 Prosecuting attorney subpoena power 
§43-606 Magistrate subpoena power 
California PEN §1326 Attendance of witnesses compelled 
by magistrate, district attorney 
or grand jury 
69. Re those states currently imposing such criminal penalties, see 
Robinson, supra note 36, at 2. 
70. One possibility for financing such investigations would be to earmark 
a percentage of the fines or civil damages for antitrust purposes. 
Texas currently employs such a device. See remarks of Mr. 
Wilson, First National Conference, supra note 27, at 8. 
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Criminal Discovery Apparatus (cont.) 
Colorado §39-2-6 t Court power to issue search warran 
§ 39-6-7 Subpoena power of court 
Connecticut §54-2a Circuit court to issue subpoena and 
warrants of capias 
§ 54-23 Warrant to be issued for witnesses 
threatening to leave jurisdiction 
Delaware T.11 §2303 Search w/o warrant 
T.11 § 2304 Provisions for search warrant 
T.11 § 2305 Objects of search warrant 
T.11 § 5101 Superior court to issue subpoenas 
Florida T.45 §§901.02to Provisions for arrest and search 
901.21 warrants 
T.45 §902.07 Magistrate to summon witnesses 
T.45§902.16 Grand ju_ry subpoena power implicit 
from duty to inquire 
Georgia §§ 27-301 to Search warrants 
27-304 
§ 27-404 Compelling attendance of witnesses 
§ 27-413 Grand jury subpoena power 
Hawaii §§255-16 & Judge or other magistrate to order 
255-17 search warrant 
§§ 222-1 to Subpoena of witnesses 
222-6 
Idaho § 19-807 Magistrate issues subpoena for 
witnesses 
§ 19-1101 Grand jury subpoena implicit in duty 
to inquire 
Illinois Ch. 38 § 683 Compulsory attendance of witnesses 
Ch. 38 § 714 Pretrial hearings of prosecution 
witnesses 
Indiana § 9-819 to Grand jury power to issue subpoena 
§ 9-823 
Iowa T.31 §751.3 to Magistrate and grand jury to have 
§ 751.12 subpoena power; provisions 
Kansas § 62-301 County attorney and attorney general 
power to issue subpoena to witnes ses 
§§62-602 & Magistrate subpoena power 
62-627 
§§ 62-916 to Grand jury subpoena power 
62-920 
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Criminal Discovery Apparatus (cont.) 
Kentucky T .IV §62 Magistrate subpoena power 
T. VI §105 Grand jury subpoena power 
Louisiana Ch.1 §15:41 Judge power to issue search warrant s 
Ch.1 §15:209 Grand jury subpoena power implied 
from duty to inquire 
Ch.1 §15:214 Grand jury power to order productio n 
of evidence 
Maine Ch.146 §20 Judge may order appearance of 
witnesses 
Ch.148 §18 After indictment, judge may order 
appearance of material witnesses 
Maryland Rule 114 Subpoena power of magistrate 
Massachusetts Ch. 277 §5 Grand jury power to inquire into 
facts of alleged crime 
Ch. 276 §45 Court to bind material witnesses by 
recognizance 
Michigan §28. 943 Grand jury subpoena power 
§ 28. 945 Penalty for noncompliance with 
subpoena 
§28.929 Magistrate subpoena power 
Minnesota § 629. 54 Recognizance by court of all materi al 
witnesses 
Mississippi T.10 Ch. 11, Grand jury subpoena power 
§§ 1886 - 1891 
Missouri T.37 §§544.420 Recognizance of material witnesses 
& 544.440 
T.37 §§540.160, Grand jury subpoena power over 
540.170, & witnesses except those to be 
540.440 called by defense 
Montana §94-6106 Magistrate order for witnesses 
§94-6120 Securance of witnesses 
§94-6316 Grand jury duty to inquire into 
alleged criminal acts 
Nebraska §29-502 Recognizance and securance of 
witnesses 
§ 29-1409 Grand jury power to compel attend-
ance of witnesses 
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Criminal Discovery Apparatus (cont,) 
Nevada §171,400 Magistrate subpoena power 
§ 171.485 Security for appearance of witnesses 
New Hampshire §595:1 Justice or magistrate to issue 
search warrant 
§ 595:6 Provision for search and seizure 
w/o warrant 
§600:3 Grand jury duty to inquire into 
alleged criminal acts 
New Jersey §2A:81-15 Sanctions for noncompliance with 
subpoena 
§2A:73-3 Grand jury duty to inquire into 
possible criminal actions 
New Mexico §41-3-7 Magistrate subpoena power 
§41-3-10 Grand jury power to call all wit-
nesses deemed necessary 
New York T,4 §245 Grand jury duty to inquire into 
criminal acts 
T,4 §250 Grand jury power to order produc-
tion of evidence 
North Carolina Ch,8 §8-59 Clerk to issue subpoena of behalf 
of either party 
North Dakota §29-07-10 Magistrate to issue subpoena for 
witnesses 
§§29-09-08 & Grand jury duty to inquire into 
29-10-18 criminal acts 
Ohio §2935.22 Magistrate to issue subpoena 
§2939,12 Grand jury subpoena power 
Oklahoma Ch,3 T,22, Securance and attendance of wit-
§§271 - 275 nesses 
Ch,8 T,22, Grand jury duty to inquire into 
§311 alleged criminal actions 
Oregon §139,020 Magistrate subpoena power at pre-
liminary hearing 
§ 139.030 District attorney to issue subpoena 
for grand jury witnesses 
§139,040 District attorney to issue subpoena 
for witnesses at trial 
§139,080 Production of books, documents, etc, 
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Criminal Discovery Apparatus (cont.) 
Pennsylvania T.19 Ch.9, Compulsory testimony of nondefen-
§ 631 dant witnesses in nonincriminatory 
matters 
Rhode Island §12-13-12 Binding witnesses to appear at trial 
South Carolina §517-309 Penalty for noncompliance with orde r 
to appear as witness 
South Dakota §34.1103 Search warrant to issue for articles 
used or to be used in commission 
of public offense 
§34.2402 Subpoena duces tecum 
§34.2403 Compulsory testimony, immunity to 
attach in such matters 
§34.1215 Grand jury power and duty to in-
quire into criminal actions 
Tennessee § 40-502 Search warrant for articles used 
or to be used in commission of 
public offense 
§ 40-1618 Grand jury subpoena power 
Texas T. 7 Ch.4, General subpoena power in all 
Arts. 461-466 magistrates 
T.7 Ch.2, Grand jury subpoena power 
Art. 382 
Utah § 77-19-1 Grand jury power and duty to in-
quire into criminal actions 
§ 77-19-4 Grand jury subpoena power 
§ 77-19-8 Grand jury power to compel pro-
duction of documents 
§ 77-15-8 Magistrate subpoena power at pre-
liminary hearings 
§ 77-45-2 Subpoena duces tecum 
Vermont § 6603 Sanctions for noncompliance with 
summons as a witness 
Virginia § 19.1-106 Recognizance of witnesses by mag-
istrates 
§19.1-155 Grand jury power and duty to in-
quire into alleged criminal actions 
§ 19.1-263 Commonwealth's attorney to issue 
subpoena for witnesses 
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Criminal Discovery Apparatus (cont.) 
Washington § 10.16. 010 Judge of Superior Court to issue 
summons for witness 
§ 10. 28. 090 Grand jury power to inquire into 
criminal actions 
§ 10. 52. 040 Compelling attendance of witnesses 
West Virginia § 6159 Recognizance of witnesses in speci-
fied cases 
§6236 Prosecuting attorney power of sub-
poena 
Wisconsin § 325. 01 Provisions for securance of witnesse s 
Wyoming § 7-105 Grand jury subpoena power 
§ 7-148 Search warrant to issue for items 
used in the commission of a public 
offense 
2. Civil Cases 
In the absence of voluntary cooperation or a compulsory proc-
ess statute, investigation of possible violations of civil antitrust 
provisions is confined to suits in progress, that is, it must await 
the filing of a civil complaint. Assuming such suit has been in-
stituted in the state courts, the ordinary discovery procedures of 
the state become activated. Current state civil discovery prac-
tice-available both to the government and to private parties in 
injunction or damage actions-7lis summarized as follows. 
71. Re those states currently providing for civil damages, see Robinson, 
supra note 36, at 1. 
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CIVIL DISCOVERY APPARATUS 
STATE CODE NO. SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS 
Alabama T. 7 Ch. 10 §§447-456 Subpoena of witnesses 
T.7 Ch,10 §§457-474 Despositions of witnesses 
T. 7 Ch.10 §§477-486 Interrogatories 
T, 7 Ch.10 §§ 487-490 Production of books and 
records 
Alaska §58-1-2 Right of inspection of public 
record 
§58-3-2 Subpoena power of witnesse s 
and records 
§§ 58-4-11 to 58-4-13 Despositions within state 
§§ 58-4-21 to 58-4-27 Despositions outside state 
Arizona §12-2212 Subpoena duces tecum, powe r 
RCP, Rules 26-37 Discovery and despositions* 
RCP, Rule 45 Subpoena of witnesses* 
Arkansas §§28-305,28-306,28-318, Deposition and discovery 
28-323,28-332,28-333, procedure 
28-346 to 28-361 
!I !I 28-801 to 28-807 Order for production of 
books and documents 
California Pt4 T3 §!11985-1993 Subpoena duces tecum and 
means of production 
Pt4 T3 §§2019-2023 Depositions 
Pt4 T3 !12024 Interrogatories 
Pt4 T3 §§2064-2066 Subpoena of witnesses; right s 
and duties 
Colorado RCP, Rules 26-37 Depositions and discovery* 
RCP, Rule 45 Subpoena of witnesses* 
Connecticut § 52-148, §52-153 Depositions 
§52-143 Subpoena of witnesses 
§52-197 Motion for disclosure of 
facts, books, records, etc 
§52-198 Disclosure by corporate 
officer 
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Civil Discovery Apparatus (cont.) 
T.10 §4301 
Chancery Rules 26-37 
Chancery Rule 45 
Superior Rules 26-37 
Superior Rule 45 
Vol. 30 Rule 1. 27 
Vol. 30 Rule 1. 28 
Vol. 30 Rule 1. 30 
Vol. 30 Rule 1. 34 
§ 38-801 to §38-1001 




§§ 9-701 to 9-707 
§§ 9-901 to 9-929 
§§ 9-1301 & 9-1302 
Ch. 110 §§ 101.16 to 
101.20 
§§ 2-1028, 2-1060, & 
2-1061 
§§ 2-1644 & 2-1645 
§§ 2-1501 to 2-1509, 
& 2-1533 to 2-1536 
T.31 §622.63 
T. 31 §622-65 
T. 31 §622. 79 
Liability for noncompliance 
with subpoena 
Discovery and depositions* 
Subpoena of witnesses* 
Discovery and depositions* 
Subpoena of witnesses* 
Interrogatories to parties 
Order for production of 
documents 
Demand for admission of 
fact & genuineness of 
documents 
Subpoena of witnesses 
Order for production of pape rs 
Discovery procedure 
Request for admission of fac t 
s & genuineness of document 
Subpoena of witness 
Inspection and discovery 
Subpoena of witnesses and 
books, records, etc. 
Depositions and interrogator· 1es 
Securance of attendance of 
witnesses 
Discovery procedures: de-
positions, inspection, etc. 
Interrogatories 
Production of books, etc. 
Depositions 
Subpoena of witnesses 
Subpoena duces tecum 
Sanctions for failure to obey 
subpoena. 
*Provisions are identical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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Civil Discovery Apparatus (cont.) 
Kansas §60-2803 Compelling party to testify 
§§60-2806 & 60-2807 Subpoena duces tecum 
§60-2833 Depositions on oral inter-
rogatories 
Kentucky Bald, Rules 26-37 Discovery and depositions* 
Bald. Rule 45 Subpoena of witnesses* 
Louisiana Bk.2 T,3 Comprehensive modes of 
Arts. 1421 to 1515 discovery, production of 
tc. documents, subpoenas, e 
Maine Ch.113 §112 Subpoena of witnesses 
Ch.117 §§1 to 32 Depositions, interrogatorie s, 
production of documents, 
et.c. 
Maryland Rule 405 Depositions on oral inter-
rogatories 
Rule 407 Summons for documentary 
evidence 
Rule 419 Inspection of records, et.c. 
Rule 422 Sanctions for noncompliance 
with discovery orders 
Massachusetts Ch,231 §61 Interrogatories 
Ch.231 §65 Interrogatories to corporati on 
Ch.231 §69 Inspection and admission of 
records and documents 
Ch. 233 §l Subpoena of witnesses 
Ch. 233 §§24 to 43 Depositions 
Michigan §§27-38 to 27.42 Discovery procedure in 
general 
§§ 27. 922 to 27. 923 Subpoena of witnesses 
Minnesota RCP Rules 26 to 37 Discovery and depositions* 
RCP Rule 45 Subpoena of witnesses* 
Mississippi §1658 Subpoena duces tecum 
§§1699 to 1701 Depositions 
§1659 Production of books, et.c. 
*Provisions are identical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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Civil Discove~y Apparatus (cont.) 
Missouri §492.300 Depositions 
§492.490 Subpoena of material witne sses 
§ 510. 020 Interrogatories 
§510.030 Order for production of 
books, records, docu-
ments, etc. 
Montana §93-8301 Demand for inspection of 
books 
§93-1501 to 93-1503 Subpoena duces tecum 
11§93-1601-1 to Modes of discovery in 
93-1601-5 general 
Nebraska 1125-1223, §25-1224 Subpoena duces tecum 
1125-1225, §25-1267 Depositions 
§25-1267. 39 Production of documents fo r 
inspection and copying 
Nevada NRCP, Rules 26-37 Discovery and depositions* 
NRCP, Rule 45 Subpoena of witnesses* 
New Hampshire §§ 516:1 - 516:7 Subpoena, attendance and 
duties of witnesses 
§§ 517:1 - 517:11 Depositions and interroga-
tories 
New Jersey §2A:81-ll Compelling testimony of 
adverse party 
§§2A:81-15, 2A:81-16 Subpoena of material wit-
nesses 
§2A:82-23 Order for production of 
original documents 
New Mexico RCP, § 21-1-1 Discovery and depositions* 
Rules 26-37 
Rule 45 Subpoena of witnesses* 
New York CPA §§288-308 Depositions and interroga-
tories 
CPA §§322-328 Admission, discovery, and 
inspection of books, rec-
ords, etc. 
*Provisions are identical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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Civil Discovery Apparatus (cont,) 
North Carolina §§1-568,1 to Pretrial hearing and discl 0-
1-568.16 sure of evidence 
§ 1-568.17 Written interrogatories 
§ 8-61 Subpoena duces tecum 
§ 8-71 to § 8-84 Depositions 
§ 8-89 to §8-91 Production and admission 
of writings 
North Dakota NDRCP Rules 26-37 Discovery and depositions* 
NDRCP Rule 45 Subpoena of witnesses* 
Ohio §§ 2319. 01 to Depositions and interroga-
2319,38 tories 
§§2317.11 to Subpoena and appearance of 
2317.15 witnesses 
§§2317.31 to Production, admission and 
2317.35 inspection of documents 
Oklahoma T .12 §§386 - 387 Subpoena duces tecum 
T .12 §§433 - 436 Depositions 
T.12 §§481 - 482 Admission and inspection of 
documents, writings, etc 
Oregon § 41. 615 Court order for inspection 
of documents 
§41. 620 Admission of facts and gen-
uineness of documents 
§§44, 110, 44.120 Subpoena duces tecum 
§45. 030 Depositions 
Pennsylvania T.28 §351 Subpoena of material wit-
nesses 
T.28 §§4 - 9 Depositions 
T.28 §61 Courts to compel productio n 
of documents 
Rhode Island §§9-17-1 to 9-17-16 Securance of witnesses 
§§9-18-1 to 9-18-15 Depositions 
§9-19-23 Provisions for production 
of documents 
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§ 36. 0202 
§§36.0301 to 
36.0532 







TRCP Rule 167 
TRCP Rule 169 
TRCP Rule 176 
TRCP Rule 186 
TRCP Rule 188 
TRCP Rule 189 
TRCP Rule 199 
§78~24-4 & 
§78-24-6 
RCP Rules 26-37 
RCP Rules 45 
T.12 §§1231 to 1251 
T.12 §§1621 to 1624 
Compelling attendance of 
witnesses 
Production of books, etc. 
Depositions 
Depositions 






Interrogatories to parties 
Sanctions for failure to 
answer interrogatories 
Circumstances authorizin 




Depositions on oral inter-
rogatories 
Subpoena duces tecum 
Production of documents 
and things for inspectio n, 
ng copying, or photographi 
Admission of fact and gen-
uineness of documents 
Subpoena of witnesses 
Depositions of witnesses 
Deposition of adverse par ty 
Written interrogatories 
Oral depositions 
Attendance and duties of 
witnesses 
Discovery and depositions * 
Subpoena of witnesses* 
Depositions and interroga-
tories 
Subpoena of witnesses and 
attachment to secure at 
tendance 
*Provisions are identifical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATE PRETRIAL PROCEDURES 27 
Civil Discovery Apparatus (cont.) 
Vermont (con't.} T.12 §1641 Compelling adverse party 
to testify 
T.12 §1691 Subpoena duces tecum; pr 0-
duction of books and 
papers 
Virginia §8-296 Compelling attendance of 
witnesses 
§8-304 Depositions of witnesses 
§ 8-320 Interrogatories to adverse 
party 
§ 8-324 & § 8-325 Production of books, ac-
counts, and other writin gs 
Washington Rules of Court: 
Rules 26-37 Discovery and depositions * 
Rules 45 Subpoena of witnesses* 
West Virginia §§ 5734 - 5739 Depositions and perpetuati on 
of testimony 
§ 5741 Summons for witness 
§5743 Production of writings by 
parties 
§5744 Production of writings by 
nonparties 
Wisconsin § 325. 01 to § 325. 03 Subpoena of witnesses 
§ 326. 05 to §326.11 DePositions 
§ 327.22 Demand to admit documen ts, 
facts, records, etc. 
Wyoming WRCP Rules 26-37 Discovery and depositions 
WRCP Rule 45 Subpoena of witnesses* 
*Provisions are identical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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3. Powers of the Attorneys General 
In addition to the ordinary procedural rules respecting dis-
covery in all criminal and civil cases, the attorneys general in 
some states have been entrusted with special investigatory powers. 
In some instances the subpoena power is very broad, for exam-
ple, embracing "every violation of the laws of the state." In 
fact, in some jurisdictions the subpoena is administrative in 
character, there being no requirement of judicial superintendence 
in issuance 72 (though under the usual rule enforcement resides 
in the courts). 73 
In other states the subpoena power is limited to antitrust 
investigations 74 or for some other purpose. 75 As the following 
chart discloses, twenty-two states (listed under the "Broad" and 
"Special A-T Limitation" categories) now provide their attorneys 
general with compulsory process with regard to suspected vio-
lations of the antitrust laws. (Two rather extensive studies have 
been conducted in relation to these powers, which, it is thought, 
obviates the need of a,ny further elaboration than that provided 
in the chart.) 7 6 
SUBPOENA POWERS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
Limited to Other 









72. See generally Fein & Stackable, The Supoena Power of the Attorney 
General (1959). 
73. An administrative agency "could not, under our system of govern-
ment, and consistently with due process of law, be invested with 
authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or 
imprisonment." Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 
U.S. 447, 485, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 (1894). 
74. E.g., Mo. Rev. Stat., § 416. 310 (1939). 
75. E.g., Md. Code Ann., art. 32A §§ 13-19 (1957 ed.) (Blue Sky Laws). 
76. See Report of Council of State Governments, "Subpoena Powers of the 
Attorney General" (1953); and Fein & Stackable, supra note 72. 
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C. Summary 
In accordance with the so-called "liberalizing tendency" of 
modern legal procedure (about twenty states have adopted the 
Federal Civil Rules outright), pretrial discovery (subpoenas, 
depositions, interrogatories, inspections, examinations, etc.) now 
performs a vital role in the administration of justice. Whether 
a government body enforcing the laws or a private party assert-
ing his rights thereunder, a litigant today possesses an impres-
sive array of factfinding devices. Private parties, seeking in-
junctions, damages, or the cancellation of contract obligations 
on the grounds of another's alleged antitrust infringements, would 
in fact appear to require no more by way of investigative ma-
chinery than the normal adjective facilities described above. 
Government prosecutions or civil actions, however, present 
a different situation. Whereas private parties are likely to be 
quite aware of interferences with their rights (for example, a 
victim of collusive bidding) in that they feel the immediate ef-
fects of an antitrust violation, the government (unless itself a 
party to such contracts, that is, in its procurement practices)77 
is not thus situated. 
Suppose, as is a usual case at the state level, a customer 
or competitor complains to the state enforcement officers that 
someone is violating the antitrust laws.78 The enforcing body 
may then request the voluntary cooperation of the suspect, for 
example, in conducting a search of his records. If the suspect 
refuses to comply, however, the courses of action open to the 
government are quite limited. Of course, the grand jury might 
be utilized if a criminal violation is suspected or a civil com-
plaint may be issued to open the doors to the discovery proce-
dures described above. 
77. Attorney General Wilson of Texas has suggested that, in the light of 
investigatory and staff problems currently confronting state antitrust 
enforcement officials, the states might do well to concentrate on 
this area. First National Conference, supra note 27, at 2. 
78. This is presently the most common means of commencement of a 
state antitrust investigation. See answers to questionnaire (Appendix 
E). 
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But instituting an action to ascertain if a violation has in 
fact occurred seems both impalpably unjust to defendants (who 
might thus be harassed without end by competitors or customers) 
and a travesty upon the very purpose of such discovery mecha-
nisms. 79 For this reason, a number of states have provided 
for precomplaint investigatory procedures, to determine if a 
suit should be instituted, rather than to commence an action to 
ascertain if a violation has actually occurred. The form of 
such investigatory mechanism is that of a broad subpoena power 
in the attorney general (described above) or a special provision 
in the antitrust law affording visitorial processes to the enforc-
ing officers (discussed below). 
79. See generally Judicial Conference of the United States, "Report on 
Procedure in Antitrust and Other Protracted Cases," 13 F. R. D. 62, 
67 (1951). 
IV. STATE PRECOMPLAINT INVESTIGATIVE POWERS 
A. In General 
Existing precomplaint subpoena powers of the state attorneys 
general have already been indicated.so· In addition, however, 
twenty-one states (by statute or judicial decision) have accorded 
to their enforcement officials visitorial powers over records, 
correspondence, papers, and other business documents. The 
specifics of such powers vary widely, and for that reason the 
relevant state statutes are reprinted as Appendix C. The pro-
posed Model State Law provision is included as Appendix D. 
The theory behind these laws is that corporations exist at 
the sufferance of the states, which are responsible for protecting 
the welfare of their inhabitants. 81 Thus, state surveillance per-
sists beyond the mere issuance of corporate charters or licenses 
to carry on a business, which may in fact be revoked for business 
misdeeds or offenses against state laws-in this case, the anti-
trust prohibitions. 82 
Some of the states import into their visitorial provisions 
the unassailability of administrative investigations (described 
above with regard to Federal Trade Commission investigations).83 
Others provide for some degree of judicial superintendence, for 
example, the requirement of a preliminary court order. 
B. Specific Provisions Summarized 
There follows an attempt to describe in chart form such 
visitorial laws as now exist at the state level. Alabama, 84 
California, 85 and Delaware86 (starred in the chart) have accom-
plished the objective by court decision. The specific statutory 
language contained in Appendix C should be noted, and the ans-
wers to the questionnaire in Appendix E should also be examined 
in this regard. 
80. See generally Fein & Stackable, supra note 72. 
81. See generally 18 Am. Jur. 2d § -U:-
82. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1402 (1949). 
83. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. 
84. First'National Conference, supra note 27, at 27 n. 3. 
85. See reference to State v. Brovelli, Appendix E. 
86. No antitrust law, but subpoena power implies power to compel books 
and records. In re Hawkins, 49 Del. 544, 121 A. 2d 486, aff'd, 50 
Del. 61, 123 A. 2d 113 (1956). 
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PRECOMPLAINT VISITORIAL POWERS BY 
THE STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
Subpoena of Inspection of Preliminary Appearance Be-
Persons Books, etc. Court Order? fore Court, etc., 
Necessary? 
Crim. cases No No Yes 
only 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Yes No No No 
No Yes No No 
Yes Yes No No 
Yes Yes No No 
No Yes No No 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Sometimes Sometimes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes No No 
No Yes No No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes No No 
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Subpoena of Inspection of Preliminary Appearance Be-
State Persons Books, etc. Court Order? fore Court, etc., 
Necessary? 
Nebraska 
(59-804) No Interrog. No No 
(59-807) No Yes No No 
New York 
(22-343) Yes Yes No No 
No. Carolina 
(75-9) Yes Yes No No 
Oklahoma 
(79-82) Yes Yes No No 
So. Carolina 
(66-112) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Texas 
(126-7439) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Utah 
(76-58-3) Yes Yes No No 
Wisconsin 
(216-11) Yes Yes No No 
Washington 
(113. 06) Yes No No No 
(113. 22) No Interrog. No No 
As is evidenced in the chart and the appendices, state prac-
tice in this regard varies. Interestingly, Washington and Hawaii 
(with two of the newest antitrust statutes) have the Civil Investi-
gative Demand Bill provisions, on the federal model, giving these 
states potentially effective investigative machinery.87 The state 
with the most extensive factfinding powers, however, is Texas. 
In Texas the attorney general or any of his authorized represen-
tatives or assistants have the power and authority to examine, at 
8 7. The statutory language is reproduced in Appendix C. 
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any time it is thought necessary, all books, records, documents, 
minutes, bylaws, telegrams, letters, and other memoranda of any 
corporation doing business in Texas, and to copy any record which 
may constitute evidence of a violation of the laws of the state. 88 
Also, the attorney general may make use of the court of inquiry 
procedure. Thus, at any time he has reason to believe that there 
are witnesses, within the jurisdiction of any county judge or jus-
tice of the peace, who have knowledge of any infraction of the 
antitrust laws of the state, the attorney general may make appli-
cation to the judge for a court of inquiry. Upon application, it 
is the duty of the judge to set a date for the inquiry and to issue 
subpoenas for designated witnesses, who are required to testify 
regarding their knowledge of antitrust violations. 89 
C. The Need for Precomplaint Process 
The need for some form of visitorial power in civil antitrust 
investigations-whether of the more extensive types used in Texas, 
Washington, or Hawaii, or of a more limited nature-cannot be 
overstated. The twenty-one states now employing such procedures 
appear to have recognized the insufficiency of complete reliance 
upon postcomplaint investigation (that is, the normal discovery 
procedures of the state civil codes) in effective antitrust enforce-
ment. 
In the absence of precomplaint process, the state is confined 
to three alternative courses of action in civil antitrust investiga-
tions: (1) voluntary cooperation of suspects; (2) the filing of a 
civil complaint for the purpose of utilizing the discovery laws; 
and (3) the use of the grand jury. All three alternatives are 
thought insufficient for identical reasons as stated by the Attorney 
General's Committee in reference to the situation at the federal 
level prior to the enactment of the Civil Investigative Demand 
Bill: 
Voluntary cooperation of parties under investigation has often been 
sufficient, but compulsory processes are required in some cases. More-
over, a Government agency should not be in a position of sole dependence 
upon voluntary cooperation for discharge of its responsibilities. 
Filing a civil complaint enables resort to the compulsory processes 
under the ••• [ procedure codes] such as interrogatories, motions to 
produce documents, depositions, etc. • • • But they come into play only 
after a complaint has been filed. Thus the • • • [ Government J cannot 
88. Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes, art. 1302-5. 01-1302-5. 06 (1961). 
89. !2_. at art. 7439. 
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utilize them to determine whether the institution of formal proceedings 
is warranted. • • • IN) o plaintiff, including the Government, may 
'pretend to bring charges in order to discover whether actual charges 
should be brought. ' These Rules were not intended to make the courts 
an investigatory adjunct to the L Government } • • • • 
The last alternative is the grand jury. Its use where civil proceed-
ings are contemplated from the outset cannot be justified on the purely 
formal ground that the • • • r antitrust law] defines a criminal offense 
appropriate for consideration by a grand jury, even though it may later 
be determined that equitable relief is more appropriate. In reality, 
resort to grand jury in essentially civil investigations stems from lack 
of an adequate civil discovery alternative. 
We believe that the use of criminal processes other than for investi-
gation with an eye toward indictment and prosecution subverts the • • • 
policy of proceeding criminally only against flagrant offenses and debases 
the law by tarring respectable citizens with the brush of crime when their 
deeds involve no criminality, 90 
Thus, it would appear imperative that those states wishing 
to pursue antitrust objectives, but currently lacking in precom-
plaint civil processes, move in the direction of their prompt 
enactment. Indeed, the most frequent complaint of state enforce-
ment officials about existing state antitrust laws is the lack of 
such processes.91 Only when precomplaint civil processes are 
available is effective antitrust enforcement possible. 
90, Supra note 65, at 344-45. 
91. ~swers to questionnaire, Appendix E. 
V. CURRENT STATUS OF STATE ENFORCEMENT 
A. Under State Laws 
As indicated above,92 in some states a resurgence is cur-
rently taking place in state antitrust activity. The answers to 
the questionnaire (Appendix E) indicate that some states without 
antitrust laws are agitating for their enactment, and that states 
with antitrust enactments are pressing for additional personnel, 
money, and statutory investigatory powers, to accomplish their 
objectives more adequately. 
Enforcement procedures differ widely. Wisconsin, for ex-
ample, exhibits dual enforcement machinery on the federal model, 
with a division of the Department of Agriculture (an administrative 
agency) charged with antitrust duties parallel to those conferred 
on the attorney general's office.93 Most states, however, rely 
opon the attorney general's office and the local district attorneys 
to enforce antitrust objectives. State enforcement procedures are 
charted below. 94 
STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
Separate A-T Part-time A.G. County or 
State Division Work on A-T Dist. Att. 
Alabama No 0 Yes 
Alaska No A-T Law 0 No 
Arizona No 9 Yes 
Arkansas No 7 No 
California No. 3 Yes 
Colorado No No Information Yes 
Connecticut No No Information Yes 
Delaware No A-T Law 0 No 
Florida No 1 Yes 
Georgia No No Information Solicitors 
Hawaii No Information No Information Yes 
92. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. 
93. See Appendix,:-" 
94. The sources are the answers to the questionnaire (Appendix E) and 
Robinson, supra note 36, at 1. 
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STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
(continued) 
Separate A-T Part-time A. G, County or 
State Division Work on A-T Dist. Att. 
Idaho No 0 No Information 
Illinois No No Information Yes 
Indiana Yes 1 Yes 
Iowa No 0 Yes 
Kansas No 1 Yes 
Kentucky No 0 Yes 
Louisiana No Staff No 
Maine No 0 Yes 
Maryland No A-T Law 0 No 
Massachusetts No Information No Information No Information 
Michigan No 1 (F-T) Yes 
Minnesota No 2 (1 F-T) Yes 
Mississippi No 8 Yes 
Missouri No 4 No 
Montana No 0 No 
Nebraska No Information No Information No Information 
Nevada No A-T Law 0 No 
New Hampshire No 0 No 
New Jersey No 0 No Information 
New Mexico No 0 Yes 
New York Yes 13 (F-T) No 
North Carolina No On Assignment Yes 
North Dakota No 1 Yes 
Ohio No 0 Yes 
Oklahoma No 0 No Information 
Oregon No 0 Yes 
Pennsylvania No A-T Law 0 No 
Rhode Island No No Information No Information 
South Carolina No 0 No Information 
South Dakota Yes 9 No 
Tennessee No 9 No Information 
Texas Yes No Information No Information 
Utah No Information No Information No Information 
Vermont No A-T Law 0 No Information 
Virginia No No Information No Information 
Washington Yes 8 (7 F-T) Yes 
West Virginia No Information No Information No Information 
Wisconsin Yes 2 (1 F-T) No 
Wyoming No 5 Yes 
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State antitrust activity, even in the states with· more vigorous 
enforcement, is meager in comparison with federal antitrust ac-
tivity. Nevertheless, on the basis of the questionnaire (Appendix 
E) and certain other surveys,95 comparative state activity may be 
assessed. Roughly, state activity at present is as follows: 96 
CURRENT STATE ANTITRUST ACTMTY 
Active as 
Fairly Ac- Limited Ac- Private Party 
tive Under tivity Under in Treble Damage 
~A-T State A-T Action Under Inactive or No Infor-




























95. Ibid. The Report of the New York State Bar Association, Special 
Committee to study the Antitrust Laws (1957) was also consulted. 
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CURRENT STATE ANTITRUST ACTIVITY 
(continued) 
Active as 
Limited Ac- Private Party 
tivity Under in Treble Damage 
State A-T Action Under Inactive or No lnfor-





















As is evident, a significant correlation exists between the 
more or less active states and the existence of precomplaint 
process. This should serve to buttress the argument made above 
that effective enforcement requires these procedures. Even those 
active states without such processes insist that antitrust objec-
tives could more effectively be served by their enactment. 97 
97. See Appendix E. 
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B. Under Federal Laws 
As the above chart indicates, a number of states-though in-
different to the adoption and/or enforcement of state antitrust 
statutes-are active as parties to treble damage actions in the 
federal courts for violations of the federal laws. Maine, Penn-
sylvania, and Washington, for example, have recovered significant 
sums in such actions. 98 
The investigative and discovery procedures available to the 
states in such instance are those normally incident to civil cases 
in the federal courts (see Appendix B). FBI reports are not 
available, although, in appropriate circumstance, grand jury min-
utes may be.99 
98. Ibid. See also Second National Conference supra note 28 at 22 et 
seq., on the treble damage activity of the iic'fue states. -
99, Compare United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 78 
S. Ct. 983 (1958), with National Dairy Products Co. v. United States, 
384 U.S. 883 (1966), remanding United States v. National Dairy, 350 
F. 2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965) for further consideration in the light of 
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966), 
VI. THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS 
A. In General 
The preceding discussion has considered the rights of govern-
ment and the public at large in regard to the enforcement of 
antitrust laws to achieve the obje of maintaining competition. 
There is another side of the coin, h ... .vever, and that concerns 
the rights of persons against whom such laws are to be enforced. 
Specifically, in the context of the present study, the question is 
raised as to the rights of defendants, or prospective defendants, 
respecting discovery or investigative demands made upon their 
testimony, books, records, papers, and so forth. 
Requiring under penalty of law that everyone keep a diary 
of his every activity and that such be open at all times to gov-
ernmental purview would certainly render the task of criminal 
law enforcement officers a great deal easier.100 Such, however, 
is not the American way. Indeed, federal and state constitutions 
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimina-
tion. The right to be secure in persons, papers, and effects-in 
a word, the right to be let alone-is at the very root of our in-
dividual-centered society. The privacy of the individual is not 
to be violated without compelling reasons.101 
Business privacy, likewise, is rooted in strong policy bases. 
Judicial protection of trade secrets, customer lists, and the likel.02 
represent legal acknowledgement of the fundamental worth of 
business freedom of operation as the mechanism best designed 
to serve the public interest. To maintain the integrity of busi-
ness, no less than that of the natural citizen, some degree of 
insulation from overreaching by the state enforcement mechanism 
is necessary and desirable. 
Rights, however, even under the First Amendment, are not 
absolute.103 Some degree of ''balancing" (between individual and 
100. E.g. Orwell, 1984 (1949). 
101. See the eloquent dissent of Brandeis, J., in Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1927). See also Lustig v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949). 
102. See generally Duane Jones Co., Inc. v. Burke, 306 N. Y. 172, N. 
E.2d 237 (1954). 
'103. But see Black, "The Bill of Rights," 35 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 863 (1960). 
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general interest) must always exist, 104 particularly in the area 
of economics. Competition has proven its worth as a regulator 
of economic growth and development. Its fruits have been salu-
tary and in all prospects will continue to prove so. Competition, 
then, must be preserved-and this, in turn, requires some degree 
of abridgment of individual and business freedoms. The question 
is where the balance is to be struck between governmental "over-
sight" or surveillance and the right of individuals and businesses 
to be let alone. 
B. Judicial versus Administrative Process 
1. Postcomplaint 
In assessing the current status of the balance with particular 
reference to investigation and discovery in state antitrust enforce-
ment, the distinction must be kept in mind between the judicial 
and administrative process. Postcomplaint process, as a rule, is 
judicial in character-that is, the means of discovery under the 
ordinary adjective laws of the state (depositions, interrogatories, 
subpoenas, etc.) are issued by, and subject to surveillance by, 
the courts.105 A party plaintiff may not probe unchecked-by his 
mere assertion of a right to do so-through the personal files of 
a defendant in the hopes of turning up some evidence against him. 
Rather, the former' s requests for discovery are contained within 
judicially supervised channels of relevancy and reasonableness. 
He must describe with reasonable specificity what he is interested 
in obtaining, thereby according to the court the means of measur-
ing the request made against the defendant's right of privacy .106 
2. Precomplaint 
Precomplaint process, on the other hand, in its essentially 
investigative character, is typically administrative (at least, on 
the civil side). 107 A government agency (or the attorney general 
acting in that capacity) is charged with pursuit of the public good. 
In the antitrust area, this means regulatory supervision over the 
104. E.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S. Ct. 804 (1959). 
105. See chart, "Civil Discovery Apparatus," supra. 
106. See Rule 26 (b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1946), 
107. See chart, "Precomplaint Visitorial Powers of the State Attorneys 
General, 11 supra. 
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entire economic organism. Some degree of visitorial powers is 
clearly requisite, whereby the government agency may maintain 
a continuing check upon the operation of those factors (for ex-
ample, competition) which the legislature has determined to be 
in the public interest and has charged the agency with safeguard-
ing. Complaints of interested parties (competitors or customer) 
to the alleged antitrust violations of others is clearly insufficient 
as a supervisory technique. The need for precomplaint process 
is manifest. 
As was stated above, precomplaint process is ordinarily ad-
ministrative in character with no, or very limited, judicial "over-
sight." Two questions are presented in this connection: (1) What 
are the implications of such process to the rights of defendants? 
and (2) Is the administrative, as opposed to judicial, process re-
quisite at this stage of the proceedings? 
As was indicated in the discussion of the investigative tech-
niques of the Federal Trade Commission,108 the scope of admini-
strative process is very broad. Likening such procedures to 
grand jury investigations, the courts have in effect read the re-
quirements of relevancy and reasonableness out of the investiga-
tive process.109 
Though agencies may not enforce their own subpoenas but 
must obtain court enforcing orders to secure compliance,110 the 
court's jurisdiction (constitutionally, at least) is only pro forma, 
that is, ministerial.111 Even the jurisdiction of the agency over 
person or subject matter is no defense to a subpoena enforce-
ment proceeding,112 The result is the absence of any significant 
degree of judicial supervision over administrative investigations. 
Some states, as was seen above, retain some degree of court 
supervision over administrative investigations, for example, the 
requirement of a preliminary court order.113 But, other states 
require no judicial superintendence at all. 114 The result of this 
108, See notes 51-57 supra and accompanying text. 
109. See Schwartz, "Administrative Law," 33 N, Y. u. L. Rev. 154, 164 
(1958), discussing c.A.B. v. Herman, 353 u.s. 322, 77 s. Ct. 
804 (1957). 
110, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S, 447, 14 
s. Ct. 1125 (1894), is the leading case for this proposition. 
111, Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S, 186, 66 
S, Ct. 494 (1946), 
112. Ibid. 
113, See chart, "Precomplaint Visitorial Powers of the State Attorneys 
General,'' p. 33 supra. 
114, Ibid. 
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latter practice is to allow fishing expeditions, intimidations, har-
assments, and violation of privacy of the worst sort. Indeed, 
under such practice a business could be subpoenaed right out of 
existence. How could a business long operate without its records 
(accounts receivable and payable, etc.) if these were subpoenaed 
for an indefinite period? 115 
C. Balancing the Interests 
1. In General 
The point to be adduced from the above discussion is that 
precomplaint investigation does not have to be entirely adminis-
trative in character. Needed information may be gathered by 
procedures more in accordance with judicial due process. As 
a former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission has stated: 
[ N] ecessary vigorous enforcement of the antitrust and other trade regu-
lation statutes must be accompanied by a maximum of fairness, due pro-
cess and equity in the enforcement program, otherwise firm enforcement 
can be a mockery.116 
The various state statutes set out in Appendix C could all stand 
some improvement in this regard. Though some sort of civil 
precomplaint process is clearly necessary to adequate antitrust 
enforcement, at least five basic requirements would appear im-
perative to the safeguard of the rights of defendants. These are 
discussed below. 
2. Essentials of Fair Precomplaint Process 
(a) Reasonable Specificity of Demand 
The first requirement of fairness to prospective defendants 
is reasonable specificity in stating the offense under investigation 
and the information and documents demanded. At the least, the 
demand should state: (1) the nature of the conduct under investi-
gation and the provision of the law applicable and (2) the class or 
classes of information to be produced, with sufficient particularity 
115. See generally Schwartz, supra note 109. 
116. Kintner, "Section 7 Circa 1960-Recent Developments and Future 
Problems as seen -by a "Federal Trade Commission Lawyer, " 39 
Texas L. Rev. 823, 831 (1961). 
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to permit the materials to be fairly identified. The Washington 
Act, for example, requires the demand to state the "statute and 
section," the alleged violation of which is under investigation.117 
A considered decision to contest the demand as unreasonable 
(discussed below) could be made only upon the basis of such in-
formation. Also, standards are thereby provided by which a re-
viewing court may measure the demand the ascertain whether it 
contains any improper or unreasonable aspects.118 
The inclusion of the requirement that the "class or classes" 
of information be given, represents a compromise between the 
demand for specific documents {which would stifle the investiga-
tory process) and a carte blanche to the government to examine 
all the business records, whether privileged or not, relevant or 
not, (which would clearly be unreasonable and unfair to defen-
dants). Obviously, some degree of latitude in specification is 
requisite. The very purpose of the proposed process statute is 
to ascertain if a violation has occurred; and this, in turn, is 
premised upon uncertainty as to the specific information that 
might reveal such violation. On the other hand, the government 
should never undertake an investigation without reasonable sus-
picion of a rather specific violation of the laws. This being the 
case, the government should at least know the classes of docu-
ments or types of data likely to disclose such violation. Fair-
ness dictates then that the "classes" of information sought be 
disclosed. 
The alternative to specificity is authorization of a kind of 
"fishing expedition," 119 the evils of which Mr. Justice Holmes 
condemned as "a search through all respondents' records, rele-
vant or irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up." 120 
The danger of unrestricted investigative powers was perhaps 
best summed up, however, by the Supreme Court in Oklahoma 
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling: 
Officious examination can be expensive, so much so that it eats up men's 
substance. It can be time consuming, clogging the processes of business. 
It can become persecution when carried beyond reason.121 
117. Wash. Rev. Code § 19. 86, 110 (2) (a) (1961). 
118. See "Comment," 37 Wash. L. Rev. 278, 289 (1962). 
119. See generally Davis, Administrative Law 57-58 (1959), 
120, F.T.C. v. American Tobacco Co,, 264U,S, 298,306, 44S, Ct. 
336, 337 (1924). 
121. Supra note 111, at 213, 66 s. Ct, 494, at 508. 
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The dictate of "reason," it is submitted, is reasonable speci-
ficity in stating the offense under investigation and the informa-
tion or documents demanded. The reasonableness of the demand 
could then be assessed by the courts under their already estab-
lished rules regarding the subpoena duces tecum. 
(b) Delimitation of Scope 
In accord with the only major change effected by the House 
of Representatives to the Federal Investigative Demand Bill, 122 
it is recommended that the scope of state statutes be restricted 
to demands for documents possessed by persons actually sus-
pected of antitrust violations. "Fishing expeditions" into the 
records of one suspected of a violation seem bad enough; it would 
be to compound the evil to make companies which are only wit-
nesses subject to such "roving inquiries." 123 
Secondly, since the very purpose of a civil demand is to fill 
the void occasioned by the unavailability of grand jury proceed-
ings in a civil investigation, and inasmuch as criminal discovery 
procedures are themselves quite adequate, it is suggested that 
the use of such documents be confined to civil suits only. The 
safeguards of criminal discovery should not be subverted by the 
utilization of less stringent civil process. In accord with this 
view, a number of the state statutes specifically declare that 
their precomplaint process shall not be applicable to criminal 
prosecutions. 124 
Thirdly, the scope of the demand should be limited to non-
privileged and otherwise "legal" evidence. Clearly, no demand 
should reach any information which would be considered unrea-
sonable or privileged under the rules established for a subpoena 
duces tecum. An example would be documents protected by the 
122. See 108 Cong. Rec. 3663, 3671 {daily ed. March 13, 1962). There 
is a strong argument contra. Thus, companies dealing with larger 
suppliers or handlers, the antitrust violations of whom actually harm 
said companies, might very well like to exhibit their books or 
records to disclose such violations. Fear of reprisal, however, 
absent a compulsory disclosure provision (applying to third parties 
as well as suspects), might in these circumstances insulate the 
violator from discovery and prosecution. On balance, however, 
the textural provision seems to outweigh this consideration. i.e., 
in favor of the right of privacy. 
123. 108 Cong. Rec. , ibid. 
124. E. g, , Wash. Rev. Code § 19. 86.110 (1) (1961). 
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attorney-client privilege. On the other hand, a corporation may 
not plead the privilege against self-incrimination (the Fifth Amend-
ment, in its federal manifestation). As a creature of the state 
and recipient of benefits therefrom, it is uniformly held that a 
corporation may not decline to answer questions when charged 
with abuse of such privileges. Further, if the books would per-
sonally incriminate the corporate officer upon whom demand is 
made, he cannot refuse to produce them, even if he made the 
incriminating parts of the records. 125 The exception is if such 
records concern only his "private or personal affairs," in which 
event the privilege would attach. The immunity against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures (the Fourth Amendment), applica-
ble in a general way to corporations,126 is discussed below. 
(c) Criminal Immunity 
If for no other reason than obtaining access to the testimony 
and records of business officials (the "private or personal af-
fairs" category, above) without transgressing the constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination, it is recommended that de-
mands to "natural persons" immunize the information from use 
in criminal prosecutions against them. Civil suits against such 
parties would still be possible as the privilege has no application 
in that context, and vital information as to business violations 
might thus be uncovered. Many of the states currently employ 
such a technique.127 
(d) Restrictions Upon Production and Use of Information 
Production of information is the very meat of the investiga-
tive proposals herein urged. But to produce and surrender origi-
nal records for removal to distant locations for long periods of 
time would be palpably unfair, and, in fact, would render continued 
business operation difficult, if not impossible. The obvious solu-
tion is that records be made available to governmental officials 
at the situs of the corporation and at reasonable hours, for "in-
spection and copying or reproduction." Thus, the government 
125. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248 (1944; and 
Essgee Co., v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 43 s. Ct. 514 (1923). 
126. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra note 111. 
127. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code. § 19.86.110 (1) (1961). On the problem 
of dual sovereignties, in this regard, see "Comment," supra note 
118, at 293-94. 
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obtains the information it desires and business is not hamstrung 
while awaiting the return of necessary documents and files. 128 
A basic requirement should be that information so obtained 
be kept strictly confidential. Trade secrets, for example, should 
be kept secret; and the statute should state specifically that the 
documents be used only in civil antitrust litigation inaugurated 
by the designated state officials. Further, the statutory mandate 
should be strictly enforced, and this applies as well to other 
arms of the government itself. As stated by the dissent in the 
St. Regis case:" 
Our Government should not, by picayunish haggling over the scope of its 
promise, permit one of its arms to do that which, by any fair construction, 
the Government has given its word that no arm will do. It is no less than 
good morals and good law that the Government should turn square corners in 
dealing with the people than that the people should turn square corners in 
dealing with their Government, 129 
Indeed, St. Regis represents exactly what state enforcement 
should scrupulously avoid. In that case, the Supreme Court up-
held the Federal Trade Commission in its attempt to secure ac-
cess to Census Bureau reports, which were declared by statute 
to be "confidential." According to the Court, the statute applied 
only to the "originals" and not to "copies," which the Commission 
might obtain without offense. Such a decision plays havoc with 
individual rights. As stated by the dissent, the "Government 
should turn square corners," and this means confidentialty. Other-
wise, respect for government wanes, noncompliance increases, 
and effective antitrust enforcement is thwarted. 
(e) Judicial Superintendence: The Requirement of 
Reasonableness 
Finally, judicial safeguards must be built into the investiga-
tory machinery. The dangers inherent in unbridled administra-
tive discretion are numerous, and have been carefully delineated 
by a number of thoughtful commentators, 130 As Lord Acton 
said: "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." 
Obviously, the administrative mechanism of investigation is in 
128. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 109. 
129. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U. S, 208, 229, 82 s. 
Ct. 289, 301 (1961) (dissent). 
130. E.g., Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 Mich. L. 
Rev. 775, 784-89 (1953). 
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need of limitation, and in our system the most appropriate limit-
ing branch of the government in this regard is the judiciary. 13l 
The important consideration is that "demandees11 132 be af-
forded some opportunity to contest the demand. Whether this 
takes the form of a defense in a proceeding by the government 
to enforce the process133 (currently, even "jurisdiction" cannot 
be raised by way of defense in such proceedings)134 or of an 
independent suit by the "demandee" to quash the demand, would 
seem to be unimportant-so long as some means of contest is 
provided. The fact that the "demandee" may always object to 
the introduction of "non-legal" evidence (for example, privileged 
information) at trial-urged by some judges as all the protection 
to which one under investigation is entitled- 135 is insufficient. 
The vice resides in the search itself-the privacy of one, against 
whom not even a civil complaint has yet been filed, has been 
violated, his business perhaps seriously disrupted. 
It is recognized that the right alluded to above is not abso-
lute. But that this is true does not require that it be complete-
ly forsaken. The provision for administrative investigation as a 
necessary prerequisite to effective antitrust enforcement can be 
afforded, while at the same time safeguarding the individual rights 
involved. The fulcrum for the "balancing of interest" here sought 
consists of the provision for judicial superintendence of the in-
vestigative processes. 
Establishment of a contest procedure ensures that privileged 
information (described above) will remain undisclosed. But, the 
scope of context should be broader than mere privilege. An 
adequate standard, it is thought, is the requirement of "reason-
ableness," presently applicable to the federal subpoena duces 
tecum. Since Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 136 which 
indicated that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to a subpoena 
ordering production of a corporation's books and records, a rather 
131. See generally re the function of "limitation" in the American politico-
legal system, Burrus, Administrative Law and Local Government 
(1963). 
132. Those upon whom demands are made or process is served. 
133. An agency or department may not enforce its own process, e.g. , 
by contempt of the agency, but must bring suit in court. Supra 
note 110. State precomplaint process should make no change in 
this regard. 
134. Supra note 111. 
135. E.g., C.A.B. v. Herman, supra note 109. 
136. Supra note 111. 
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definite body of law has developed concerning the requirement of 
reasonableness. Included are three components: 
1. The documents must be relevant to the investigation being pursued. 
Relevance is satisfied by showing a relation between the documents which 
must be produced and the inquiry. 
2. The subpoena must specify the documents to be produced with 
reasonable particularity. This requires "specification ..• adequate, 
but not excessive, for the purposes of the relevant inquiry." The 
subpoena meets this test if it distinguishes between relevant and ir-
relevant material, though some cases add the requirement that the 
supoena must specify the documents to be produced or the subjects 
to which they relate with enough precision to make compliance pos-
sible. 
3. The subpoena may order the production of records covering 
only a reasonable period of time. The facts of each case determine 
whether the time period covered by the records sought is reasonable. 
It must bear some relation to the subject of the investigation. The 
following factors affect the reasonableness of the period covered: 
The type and extent of the investigation; the materiality of the sub-
ject matter to the type of investigation; the particularity with which 
the documents are described; the good faith of the party demanding 
the broad coverage; [and] a showing of the need for such extended 
coverage.137 
The objection to such judicial "oversight" is that it is ob-
structive. Thus, the complaint is made that contest will occur 
in every case-slowing down, if not halting completely, the in-
vestigative machinery. 138 Mr. Benjamin's answer, however, 
seems persuasive: 
Investigation is in many cases the first, and in many the only, point of 
personal contact between an [ investigatory] • • • agency and the person 
with whom the agency is dealing. The investigatory personnel is more 
numerous than any other that comes into contact with the public. Dis-
satisfaction with the way in which that personnel performs its duties 
could thus go far to impair public confidence in the whole [ investigatory J 
••• process.139 
137. "Comment," supra note 118, at 292-93. 
138. E.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra note 111. 
139. Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in New York 73 (1942). 
52 INVESTIGATION AND DISCOVERY 
As important as antitrust enforcement is, its accomplishment 
must be achieved by a maximum of fairness, due process, and 
equity; and this is true regardless of the fact that obstruction 
may occur in a particular case. "Otherwise," to recall the 
words of Mr. Kintner, "firm enforcement can be a mockery."140 
140. SUpra note 116. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The 1960's currently manifest prospects of becoming a decade 
of the most vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws. The states, 
as well as the federal government, are entering the enforcement 
arena, thus filling a void which has previously existed respecting 
threats to competition of local effect outside the control of the 
federal statutes. Federal-state cooperation seems clearly neces-
sary to achieve the objectives of the antitrust laws. 
A vital aspect of antitrust enforcement is investigation and 
discovery. Information must be gathered, first, to determine 
whether to institute an antitrust action because a violation has 
occurred and, secondly, to discover evidence to utilize if suit 
is contemplated. The current status of state discovery, both 
criminal and civil, has been analyzed in both its precomplaint 
and postcomplaint aspects. The principal problem that presently 
faces state enforcement programs has been ascertained to be 
that of providing precomplaint civil processes-to determine whe-
ther a suit should in fact be instituted. 
The civil investigative demand or visitorial statute thus en-
visioned, however, should recognize individual rights. The ad-
ministrative subpoena, which in the hands of unscrupulous ad-
ministrators can become a kind of general warrant, is not neces-
sary. Factfinding is quite possible in the presence of general 
judicial supervision. In the balancing of interests between effec-
tive government enforcement and the rights of parties defendant, 
five general requirements of a fair and equitable civil process 
statute have been indicated. These are: 
(a) Reasonable Specificity of Demand; 
(b) Delimitation of Scope of Demand; 
(c) Criminal Immunity; 
(d) Restrictions Upon Production and Use of Information; 
(e) Judicial Superintendence. 




ANTITRUST CIVIL PROCESS ACT 
AN ACT 
76 Stat. 518 (1962) 
To authorize the Attorney General to compel the production of 
documentary evidence required in civil investigations for the 
enforcement of the antitrust laws, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as the "Antitrust Civil Process Act". 
DEFINITIONS 
Sec. 2. For the purposes of this Act-
(a) The term "antitrust law" includes: 
(1) Each provision of law defined as one of the anti-
trust laws by section 1 of the Act entitled "An Act to 
supplement existing Jaws against unlawful restraints 
and monopolies, and for other purposes," approved 
October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730, as amended; 15 U.S.C. 
12), commonly known as the Clayton Act; 
(2) The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 
41 and the following); and 
(3) Any statute hereafter enacted by the Congress 
which prohibits, or makes available to the United States 
in any court of the United States any civil remedy with 
respect to (A) any restraint upon or monopolization or 
interstate or foreign trade or commerce, or (B) any 
unfair trade practice in or affecting such commerce; 
(b) The term "antitrust order" means any final order, 
decree, or judgment of any court of the United States, duly 
entered in any case or proceeding arising under any anti-
trust law; 
(c) The term "antitrust investigation" means any inquiry 
conducted by any antitrust investigator for the purpose of 
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ascertaining whether any person is or has been engaged in 
any antitrust violation; 
(d} The term "antitrust violation" means any act or omis-
sion in violation of any antitrust law or any antitrust order; 
(e} The term "antitrust investigator" means any attorney 
or investigator employed by the Department of Justice who 
is charged with the duty of enforcing or carrying into effect 
any antitrust law; 
(f} The term "person" means any corporation, association, 
partnership, or other legal entity not a natural person; 
(g) The term "documentary material" includes the original 
or any copy of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper, 
communication, tabulation, chart, or other document; and 
(h} The term "custodian" means the antitrust document 
custodian or any deputy custodian designated under section 
4 (a} of this Act. 
CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND 
Sec. 3. (a) Whenever the Attorney General, or the Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice, has reason to believe that any person under 
investigation may be in possession, custody, or control of any 
documentary material relevant to a civil antitrust investigation, 
he may, prior to the institution of a civil or criminal proceeding 
thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such per-
son, a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce 
such material for examination. 
(b) Each such demand shall-
(1) state the nature of the conduct constituting the 
alleged antitrust violation which is under investigation 
and the provision of law applicable thereto; 
(2) describe the class or classes of documentary 
material to be produced thereunder with such definite-
ness and certainty as to permit such material to be 
fairly identified; 
(3) prescribe a return date which will provide a rea-
sonable period of time within which the material so 
demanded may be assembled and made available for 
inspection and copying or reproduction; and 
(4) identify the custodian to whom such material 
shall be made available. 
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(c) No such demand shall-
(1) contain any requirement which would be held to 
be unreasonable if contained in a subpoena duces tecum 
issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand 
jury investigation of such alleged antitrust violation; or 
(2) require the production of any documentary evi-
dence which would be privileged from disclosure if 
demanded by a subpoena duces tecum issued by a 
court of the United States in aid of a grand jury in-
vestigation of such alleged antitrust violation. 
(d} Any such demand may be served by any antitrust in-
vestigator, or by any United States marshal or deputy 
marshal, at any place within the territorial jurisdiction of 
any court of the United States. 
(e) Service of any such demand or of any petition filed 
under section 5 of this Act may be made upon a partner-
ship, corporation, association, or other legal entity by-
(1) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to any 
partner, executive officer, managing agent, or general 
agent thereof, or to any agent thereof authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process 
on behalf of such partnership, corporation, association, 
or entity; 
(2) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the 
principal office or place of business of the partnership, 
corporation, association, or entity to be served; or 
(3) depositing such copy in the United States mails, 
by registered or certified mail duly addressed to such 
partnership, corporation, association, or entity at its 
principal office or place of business. 
(f) A verified return by the individual serving any such 
demand or petition setting forth the manner of such service 
shall be proof of such service. In the case of service by 
registered or certified mail, such return shall be accom-
panied by the return post office receipt of delivery of such 
demand. 
ANTITRUST DOCUMENT CUSTODIAN 
Sec. 4. (a) The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice shall designate an 
antitrust investigator to serve as antitrust document custodian, 
and such additional antitrust investigators as he shall determine 
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from time to time to be necessary to serve as deputies to such 
officer. 
(b) Any person upon whom any demand issued under section 
3 has been duly served shall make such material available for 
inspection and copying or reproduction to the custodian designated 
therein at the principal place of business of such person (or at 
such other place as such custodian and such person thereafter may 
agree and prescribe in writing or as the court may d~rect, pur-
suant to section 5(d) of this Act) on the return date specified in 
such demand (or on such later date as such custodian may pre-
scribe in writing). Such person may upon written agreement be-
tween such person and the custodian substitute for copies of all 
or part of such material originals thereof. 
(c) The custodian to whom any documentary material is so 
delivered shall take physical possession thereof, and shall be re-
sponsible for the use made thereof and for the return thereof 
pursuant to this Act. The custodian may cause the preparation 
of such copies of such documentary material as may be required 
for official use under regulations which shall be promulgated by 
the Attorney General. While in the possession of the custodian, 
no material so produced shall be available for examination, with-
out the consent of the person who produced such material, by any 
individual other than a duly authorized officer, member, or em-
ployee of the Department of Justice. Under such reasonable terms 
and conditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe, documen-
tary material while in the possession of the custodian shall be 
available for examination by the person who produced such ma-
terial or any duly authorized representative of such person. 
(d) Whenever any attorney has been designated to appear on 
behalf of the United States before any court or grand jury in any 
case or proceeding involving any alleged antitrust violation, the 
custodian may deliver to such attorney such documentary material 
in the possession of the custodian as such attorney determines to 
be required for use in the presentation of such case or proceeding 
on behalf of the United States. Upon the conclusion of any such 
case or proceeding, such attorney shall return to the custodian 
any documentary material so withdrawn which has not passed into 
the control of such court or grand jury through the introduction 
thereof into the record of such case or proceeding. 
(e) Upon the completion of (1) the antitrust investigation for 
which any documentary material was produced under this Act, and 
(2) any case or proceeding arising from such investigation, the 
custodian shall return to the person who produced such material 
all such material (other than copies thereof made by the Department 
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of Justice pursuant to subsection (c) ) which has not passed into 
the control of any court or grand jury through the introduction 
thereof into the record of such case or proceeding. 
(f) When any documentary material has been produced by any 
person under this Act for use in any antitrust investigation, and 
no such case or proceeding arising therefrom has been instituted 
within a reasonable time after completion of the examination and 
analysis of all evidence assembled in the course of such investi-
gation, such person shall be entitled, upon written demand made 
upon the Attorney General or upon the Assistant Attorney General 
in charge of the Antitrust Division, to the return of all documen-
tary material (other than copies thereof made by the Department 
of Justice pursuant to subsection (c) ) so produced by such person. 
(g) In the event of the death, disability, or separation from 
service in the Department of Justice of the custodian of any doc-
umentary material produced under any demand issued under this 
Act, or the official relief of such custodian from responsibility 
for the custody and control of such material, the Assistant Attor-
ney General in charge of the Antitrust Division shall promptly (1) 
designate another antitrust investigator to serve as custodian there· 
of, and (2) transmit notice in writing to the person who produced 
such material as to the identity and address of the successor so 
designated. Any successor so designated shall have with regard 
to such materials all duties and responsibilities imposed by this 
Act upon his predecessor in office with regard thereto, except 
that he shall not be held responsible for any default or dereliction 
which occurred before his designation as custodian. 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Sec. 5. (a) Whenever any person fails to comply with any 
civil investigative demand duly served upon him under section 3 
or whenever satisfactory copying or reproduction of any such ma-
terial cannot be done and such person refuses to surrender such 
material, the Attorney General, through such officers or attorneys 
as he may designate, may file, in the district court of the United 
States for any judicial district in which such person resides, is 
found, or transacts business, and serve upon such person a peti-
tion for an order of such court for the enforcement of this Act, 
except that if such person transacts business in more than one 
such district such petition shall be filed in the district in which 
such person maintains his principal place of business; or in such 
other district in which such person transacts business as may be 
agreed upon by the parties to such petition. 
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(b) Within twenty days after the service of any such demand 
upon any person, or at any time before the return date specified 
in the demand, whichever period is shorter, such person may file, 
in the district court of the United States for the judicial district 
within which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, 
and serve upon such custodian a petition for an order of such 
court modifying or setting aside such demand. The time allowed 
for compliance with the demand in whole or in part as deemed 
proper and ordered by the court shall not run during the pendency 
of such petition in the court. Such petition shall specify each 
ground upon which the petitioner relies in seeking such relief, 
and may be based upon any failure of such demand to comply with 
the provisions of this Act, or upon any constitutional or other 
legal right or privilege of such person. 
(c) At any time during which any custodian is in custody or 
control of any documentary material delivered by any person in 
compliance with any such demand, such person may file, in the 
district court of the United States for the judicial district within 
which the office of such custodian is situated, and serve upon such 
custodian a petition for an order of such court requiring the per-
formance by such custodian of any duty imposed upon him by this 
Act. 
(d) Whenever any petition is filed in any district court of the 
United States under this section, such court shall have jurisdiction 
to hear and determine the matter so presented, and to enter such 
order or orders as may be required to carry into effect the pro-
visions of this Act. Any final order so entered shall be subject 
to appeal pursuant to section 1291 of title 28 of the United States 
Code. Any disobedience of any final order entered under this 
section by any court shall be punished as a contempt thereof. 
(e) To the extent that such rules may have application and are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure shall apply to any petition under this Act. 
CRIMINAL PENALTY 
Sec. 6. (a) Section 1505, title 18, United States Code, is 
amended to read as follows: 
"§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, 
and committees 
"Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threaten-
ing letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or 
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impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any depart-
ment or agency of the United States, or in connection with any 
inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any com-
mittee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; 
or 
''Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or pro-
perty on account of his attending or having attended such proceed-
ing, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or 
having testified to any matter pending therein; or 
"Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct 
compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand 
duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act 
willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, 
alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material 
which is the subject of such demand; or 
"Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threat-
ening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes 
or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper 
administration of the law under which such proceeding is being 
had before such department or agency of the United States, or the 
due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such 
inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any com-
mittee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress-
"Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both." 
(b) The analysis of chapter 73 of title 18 of United States Code 
is amended so that the title of section 1505 shall read therein as 
follows: 
"1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, 
and committees." 
SAVING PROVISION 
Sec. 7. Nothing contained in this Act shall impair the author-
ity of the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, or 
any antitrust investigator to (a) lay before any grand jury impanel-
ed before any district court of the United States any evidence con-
cerning any alleged antitrust violation, {b) invoke the power of any 
such court to compel the production of any evidence before any 
such grand jury, or (c) institute any proceeding for the enforce-
ment of any order or process issued in execution of such power, 
or to punish disobedience of any such order or process by any person, 
including a natural person. 
Approved September 19, 1962. 
APPENDIXB 
DISCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 26. 
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION 
(a) When Depositions May Be Taken. Any party may take 
the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon 
oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of 
discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. 
After commencement of the action the deposition may be taken 
without leave of court, except that leave, granted with or without 
notice, must be obtained if notice of the taking is served by the 
plaintiff within 20 days after commencement of the action. The 
attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena 
as provided in Rule 45. Depositions shall be taken only in ac-
cordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined 
in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as 
the court prescribes. As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. March 19, 
1948. 
(b) Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise order by the 
court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be exa-
mined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it re-
lates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the 
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, de-
scription, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground 
for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial 
if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence. As amended Dec. 27, 1946, 
eff. March 19, 1948. 
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Rule 31. 
DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES UPON WRITTEN 
INTERROGATORIES 
(a) Serving Interrogatories; Notice. A party desiring to take 
the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall 
serve them upon every other party with a notice stating the name 
and address of the person who is to answer them and the name 
or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the 
deposition is to be taken. Within 10 days thereafter a party so 
served may serve cross interrogatories upon the party proposing 
to take the deposition. Within 5 days thereafter the latter may 
serve redirect interrogatories upon a party who has served cross 
interrogatories. Within 3 days after being served with redirect 
interrogatories, a party may serve recross interrogatories upon 
the party proposing to take the deposition. 
Rule 33. 
INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES 
Any party may serve upon any adverse party written interrog-
atories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served 
is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association, 
by any officer or agent, who shall furnish such information as is 
available to the party. Interrogatories may be served after com-
mencement of the action and without leave of court, except that, 
if service is made by the plaintiff within 10 days after such com-
mencement, leave of court granted with or without notice must 
first be obtained. The interrogatories shall be answered separate-
ly and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed 
by the person making them; and the party upon whom the interroga-
tories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the 
party submitting the interrogatories within 15 days after the serv-
ice of the interrogatories, unless the court, on motion and notice 
and for good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time. Within 
10 days after service of interrogatories a party may serve written 
objections thereto together with a notice of hearing the objections 
at the earliest practicable time. Answers to interrogatories to 
which objection is made shall be deferred until the objections are 
determined. 
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Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be in-
quired into under Rule 26(b), and the answers may be used to 
the same extent as provided in Rule 26(d) for the use of the de-
position of a party. Interrogatories may be served after a de-
position has been taken, and a deposition may be sought after in-
terrogatories have been answered, but the court, on motion of the 
deponent or the party interrogated, may make such protective 
order as justice may require. The number of interrogatories or 
of sets of interrogatories to be served is not limited except as 
justice requires to protect the party from annoyance, expense, 
embarrassment, or oppression. The provisions of Rule 30{b) are 
applicable for the protection of the party from whom answers to 
interrogatories are sought under this rule. As amended Dec. 27, 
1946, eff. March 19, 1948. 
Rule 34. 
DISCOVERY AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND 
TIDNGS FOR INSPECTION, COPYING, OR PHOTOGRAPIDNG 
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and 
upon notice to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of 
Rule 30 (b), the court in which an action is pending may .(1) or-
der any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying 
or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any 
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photo-
graphs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which consti-
tute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the 
scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are 
in his possession, custody, or control; or (2) order any party to 
permit entry upon designated land or other property in his pos-
session or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, sur-
veying, or photographing the property or any designated object or 
operation thereon within the scope of the examination permitted 
by Rule 26{b). The order shall specify the time, place, and man-
ner of making the inspection and taking the copies and photographs 
and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. As 
amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. March 19, 1948. 
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Rule 35. 
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS 
(a) Order for Examination. In an action in which the mental 
or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in 
which the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical 
or mental examination by a physician. The order may be made 
only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the party 
to be examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time, 
place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the 
person or persons by whom it is to be made. 
Rule 37. 
REFUSAL TO MAKE DISCOVERY: CONSEQUENCES 
(a) Refusal to Answer. If a party or other deponent refuses 
to answer any question propounded upon oral examination, the 
examination shall be completed on other matters or adjourned, 
as the proponent of the question may prefer. Thereafter, on rea-
sonable notice to all persons affected thereby, he may apply to 
the court in the district where the deposition is taken for an order 
compelling an answer. Upon the refusal of a deponent to answer 
any interrogatory submitted under Rule 31 or upon the refusal of 
a party to answer any interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, the 
proponent of the question may on like notice make like application 
for such an order. If the motion is granted and if the court finds 
that the refusal was without substantial justification the court shall 
require the refusing party or deponent and the party or attorney 
advising the refusal or either of them to pay to the examining 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining 
the order, including reasonable attorney's fees. If the motion is 
denied and if the court finds that the motion was made without 
substantial justification, the court shall require the examining 
party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay 
to the refusing party or witness the amount of the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in opposing the motion, including reasonable at-
torney's fees. 
(b) Failure to Comply With Order. 
{l) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn 
or refuses to answer any question after being directed to do so by 
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the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, 
the refusal may be considered a contempt of that court. 
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(2) Other Consequences. If any party or an officer or man-
aging agent of a party refuses to obey an order made under sub-
division (a) of this rule requiring him to answer designated ques-
tions, or an order made under Rule 34 to produce any document 
or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to 
permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other prop-
erty, or an order made under Rule 35 requiring him to submit to 
a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders 
in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the follow-
ing: 
(i) An order that the matters regarding which the questions 
were asked, or the character or description of the thing or land, 
or the contents of the paper, or the physical or mental condition 
of the party, or any other designated facts shall be taken to be 
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the 
claim of the party obtaining the order; 
Rule 45. 
SUBPOENA 
(a) For Attendance of Witnesses; Form; Issuance. Every 
subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under the seal of the court, 
shall state the name of the court and the title of the action, and 
shall command each person to whom it is directed to attend and 
give testimony at a time and place therein specified. The clerk 
shall issue a subpoena, or a subpoena for the production of docu-
mentary evidence, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank, to a 
party requesting it, who shall fill it in before service. 
(b) For Production of Documentary Evidence. A subpoena 
may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce 
the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated there-
in; but the court, upon motion made promptly and in any event at 
or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance there-
with, may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable 
and oppressive or (2) condition denial of the motion upon the ad-
vancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued 
of the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers, documents, 
or tangible things. As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. March 19, 1948. 
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(c) Service. A subpoena may be served by the marshal, by 
his deputy, or by any other person who is not a party and is not 
less than 18 years of age. Service of a subpoena upon a person 
named therein shall be made by delivering a copy thereof to such 
person and by tendering to him the fees for on day's attendance 
and the mileage allowed by law. When the subpoena is issued on 
behalf of the United States or an officer or agency thereof, fees 
and mileage need not be tendered. 
(d) Subpoena for Taking Depositions; Place of Examination. 
(1) Proof of service of a notice to take a deposition as pro-
vided in Rules 30(a) and 3l(a) constitutes a sufficient authoriza-
tion for the issuance by the clerk of the district court for the 
district in which the deposition is to be taken of subpoenas for 
the persons named or described therein. The subpoena may com-
mand the person to whom it is directed to produce designated 
books, papers, documents, or tangible things which constitute or 
contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope 
of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b), but in that event the 
subpoena will be subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) of 
Rule 30 and subdivision (b) of this Rule 45. 
(2) A resident of the district in which the deposition is to be 
taken may be required to attend an examination only in the county 
wherein he resides or is employed or transacts his business in 
person, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by an order 
of court. A nonresident of the district may be required to attend 
only in the county wherein he is served with a subpoena, or within 
40 miles from the place of service, or at such other convenient 
place as is fixed by an order of court. As amended Dec. 27, 
1946, eff. March 19, 1948. 
(f) Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate excuse 
to obey a subpoena served upon him may be deemed a contempt 
of the court from which the subpoena issued. 
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STATE ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION STATUTES 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §44-1407 (1956) 
A. The superior court shall, upon good cause shown and upon 
written application of the county attorney or attorney general, 
cause issuance and service of subpoenas upon witnesses named 
in the application, for the appearance in court of such witnesses. 
The witnesses shall testify to any knowledge they have of a viola-
tion of this article. 
B. Any person subpoenaed and examined as provided by this 
section shall not be liable to criminal prosecution for the viola-
tion of this article about which he testifies, * * * 
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 205A-l-16 (Supp. 1961) 
(1) Whenever it appears to the attorney general, either upon 
complaint or otherwise, that any person or persons, has engaged 
in or engages in or is about to engage in any act or practice by 
this Act prohibited or declared to be illegal, or that any person 
or persons, has assisted or participated in any plan, scheme, 
agreement or combination of the nature described herein, or 
whenever he believes it to be in the public interest that an in-
vestigation be made, he may in his discretion either require or 
permit such complainant to file with him a statement in writing 
under oath or otherwise as to all the facts and circumstances 
concerning the subject matter which he believes to be in the public 
interest to investigate. The attorney general may also require 
such other data and information from such complainant as he may 
deem relevant and may make such special and independent investi-
gations as he may deem necessary in connection with the matter. 
(2) Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that 
any person may be in possession, custody, or control of any docu-
mentary material, objects, tangible things or information (herein-
after referred to as "documentary evidence") pertinent to any in-
vestigation of a possible violation of this Act and before the filing 
of any complaint in court, he may issue in writing, and cause to 
be served upon such person, an investigative demand requiring 
such person to produce such documentary evidence for examination. 
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(3) Each such demand shall: 
(a) state that an alleged violation of the section or sections of 
this Act which are under investigation; 
{b) describe and fairly indentify the documentary evidence to 
be produced, or to be answered; 
(c) prescribe a return date within a reasonable period of time 
during which the documentary evidence demanded may be assembled 
and produced; 
(d) identify the custodian to whom such documentary evidence 
are to be delivered; and 
(e) specify a place at which such delivery is to be made. 
(4) No such demand shall: 
(a) contain any requirement which would be held to be unrea-
sonable if contained in a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court 
of this State in aid of a grand jury investigation of such possible 
violation; or 
(b) require the production of any documentary evidence which 
would be privileged from disclosure if demanded by a subpoena 
duces tecum issued by a court of this State in aid of a grand jury 
investigation of such possible violation. 
(5) Any such demand may be served by an attorney employed 
by or other authorized employee of this State at any place within 
the territorial jurisdiction of any court of this State. 
(6) Service of any such demand or of any petition filed under 
subsection 15 of this section, may be made upon a partnership, 
trust, corporation, association, or other legal entity by: 
(a) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to any partner, 
trustee, executive officer, managing agent, or general agent there-
of, or to any agent, thereof authorized by appointment or by law 
to receive service or [ of] process on behalf of such partnership, 
trust, corporation, association, or entity; or 
(b) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the principal 
office or place of business in this State of the partnership, trust, 
corporation, association, or entity to be served; or 
(c) depositing such copy in the United States mails, by regi-
stered or certified mail duly addressed to such partnership, trust, 
corporation, association or entity at its principal office or place 
of business in this State. 
(7) A verified return by the individual serving any such demand 
or petition setting forth the manner of such service shall be proof 
of such service. In the case of service by registered or certified 
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mail, such return shall be accompanied by the return post office 
· receipt of delivery of such demand or petition. 
(8) The attorney general shall designate a representative to 
serve as custodian of any documentary evidence, and such addi-
tional representatives as he shall determine from time to time 
to be necessary to serve as deputies to such officer. 
(9) Any person upon whom any demand issued under subsec-
tion (2) has been duly served shall deliver such documentary evi-
dence to the custodian designated therein as the place specified 
therein (or at such other place as such custodian thereafter may 
prescribe in writing) on the return date specified in such demand 
(or on such other date as such custodian may prescribe in writ-
ing). No such demand or custodian may require delivery of any 
documentary evidence to be made: 
(a) at any place outside the territorial jurisdiction of this 
State without the consent of the person upon whom such demand 
was served; or 
(b) at any place other than the place at which such documen-
tary evidence is situated at the time of service of such demand 
until the custodian has tendered to such person a sum sufficient 
to defray the cost of transporting such material to the place pre-
scribed for delivery or the transportation thereof to such place at 
government expense. 
(10) The custodian to whom any documentary evidence is so 
delivered shall take physical possession thereof, and shall be re-
sponsible for the use made thereof and for the return thereof pur-
suant to this section. The custodian shall issue a receipt for such 
evidence received. The custodian may cause the preparation of 
such copies of such documentary evidence as may be required for 
official use by any individual who is entitled, under regulations 
which shall be promulgated by the attorney general, to have ac-
cess to such evidence for examination. While in the possession 
of the custodian, no such evidence so produced shall be available 
for examination, without the consent of the person who produced 
such evidence, by any individual other than a duly authorized rep-
resentative of the office of the attorney general. Under such rea-
sonable terms and conditions as the attorney general shall pre-
scribe, documentary evidence while in the possession of the custo-
dian shall be available for examination by the person who produced 
such evidence or any duly authorized representative of such person. 
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(11) Whenever any attorney has been designated to appear on 
behalf of this State before any court or grand jury in any case or 
proceeding involving any alleged violation of this Act, the custodian 
may deliver to such attorney such documentary evidence in the 
possession of the custodian as such attorney determines to be re-
quired for use in the presentation of such case or proceeding on 
behalf of this State. Upon the conclusion of any such case or pro-
ceeding, such attorney shall return to the custodian any documen-
tary evidence so withdrawn which has not passed into the control 
of such court or grand jury through the introduction thereof into 
the record of such case or proceeding. 
(12) Upon the completion of the investigation for which any 
documentary evidence was produced under this section, and any 
case or proceeding arising from such investigation, the custodian 
shall return to the person who produced such evidence all such 
evidence (other than copies thereof made by the attorney general 
or his representative pursuant to subsection (10} of this section) 
which has not passed into the control of any court or grand jury 
through the introduction thereof into the record of such case or 
proceeding. 
(13) When any documentary evidence has been produced by any 
person under this section for use in any investigation, and no such 
case or proceeding arising therefrom has been instituted within a 
reasonable time after completion of the examination and analysis 
of all evidence assembled in the court of such investigation, such 
person shall be entitled, upon written demand made upon the at-
torney general to the return of all documentary evidence (other 
than copies thereof made by the attorney general or his represen-
tative pursuant to subsection (10) of this section) so produced by 
such person. 
(14) In the event of the death, disability, or separation from 
service in the office of the attorney general of the custodian of 
any documentary evidence produced under any demand issued under 
this section, or the official relief of such custodian from responsi-
bility for the custody and control of such evidence, the attorney 
general shall promptly designate another representative to serve 
as custodian thereof, and transmit notice in writing to the person 
who produced such evidence as to the identity and address of the 
successor so designated. Any successor so designated shall have 
with regard to such evidence all duties and responsibilities imposed 
by this section upon his predecessor in office with regard thereto, 
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except that he shall not be held responsible for any default or 
dereliction which occurred before his designation as custodian. 
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(15) Whenever any person fails to comply with any investiga-
tive demand duly served upon him under subsection (6) of this 
section, the attorney general, through such officers or attorneys 
as he may designate, may file, in the district court of any county 
in which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, and 
serve upon such person a petition for an order of such court for 
the enforcement of such demand, except that if such person trans-
acts business in more than one such county such petition shall be 
filed in the county in which such person maintains his principal 
place of business, or in such other county in which such person 
transacts business as may be agreed upon by the parties to such 
petition. Such person shall be entitled to be heard in opposition 
to the granting of any such petition. 
(16) Within twenty days after the service of any such demand 
upon any person, or at any time before the return date specified 
in the demand, whichever period is shorter, such person may file, 
in the district court of the county within which the office of the 
custodian designated therein is situated, and serve upon such cus-
todian a petition for an order of such court modifying or setting 
aside such demand. Such petition shall specify each ground upon 
which the petitioner relies in seeking such relief, and may be 
based upon any failure of such demand to comply with the provi-
sions of this section, or upon any constitutional right or privilege 
of such person. 
If the court does not set aside such demand, such person 
shall be assessed court cost and reasonable attorneys' fees and 
such other penalties not greater than those specified under Section 
14 of this Act. If the Court sets aside such demand, such person 
shall be given the total cost of such petition. 
{17) At any time during which any custodian is in custody or 
control of any documentary evidence delivered by any person in 
compliance with any such demand, such person may file, in the 
district court of the county within which the office of such custo-
dian is situated, and serve upon such custodian a petition for an 
order of such court requiring the performance of such custodian 
of any duty imposed upon him by this section. 
{18) Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that 
any person has information pertinent to any investigation of a 
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possible violation of this Act and before the filing of any complaint 
in court, he may seek a subpoena from the clerk of the district 
court in the county where such person resides, is found or trans-
acts business, requiring his presence to appear before a district 
magistrate licensed to practice law in the Supreme Court of this 
State to give oral testimony under oath on a specified date, time 
and place. The clerk of the district court may also issue a sub-
poena duces tecum under like conditions at the request of the at-
torney general. Any witness subpoenaed shall be entitled to be 
represented by counsel and any subpoena shall state the alleged 
violation of the section or sections of this Act. The scope and 
manner of examination shall be in accordance with the rules gov-
erning depositions as provided in the Hawaii Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The person subpoenaed may at any time before the date 
specified for the taking of the oral testimony, move to quash any 
subpoena before said district magistrate from whose court any 
subpoena was issued for such grounds as may be provided for 
quashing a subpoena in accordance with the rules governing depo-
sitions as set forth in the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(19) No person shall be excused from attending an inquiry pur-
suant to the mandates of a subpoena, or from producing any docu-
mentary evidence, or from being examined or required to answer 
questions on the ground of failure to tender or pay a witness fee 
or mileage unless demand therefor is made at the time testimony 
is about to be taken and as a condition precedent to offering such 
production or testimony and unless payment thereof be not there-
upon made. The provisions for payment of witness fee and mileage 
do not apply to any officer, director or person in the employ of 
any person or persons whose conduct or practices are being in-
vestigated. No person who is subpoenaed to attend such inquiry, 
while in attendance upon such inquiry, shall, without reasonable 
cause, refuse to be sworn or to answer any question or to pro-
duce any book, paper, document, or other record when ordered to 
do so by the officer conducting such inquiry, or fail to perform 
any act hereunder required to be performed. 
(20) Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct 
compliance in whole or in part, by any person with any investiga-
tive demand made under this section, willfully removes from any 
place, conceals, withholds, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by any 
other means falsifies any documentary evidence in the possession, 
custody or control of any person which is the subject of any such 
demand duly served upon any person shall be fined not more than 
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$5,000.00 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Any 
person willfully failing to comply with a subpoena issued pursuant 
to subsection (18) of this section shall be fined not more than 
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 
(21) Nothing contained in this section shall impair the authority 
of the attorney general or his representatives to lay before any 
grand jury impaneled before any circuit court of this State any 
evidence concerning any alleged violation of this Act, invoke the 
power of any such court to compel the production of any evidence 
before any such grand jury, or institute any proceeding for the 
enforcement of any order or process issued in execution of such 
power, or to punish disobedience of any such order or process 
by any person. 
(22) As used in this section the term "documentary material" 
includes the original or any copy of any book, record, report, 
memorandum, paper, communication, tabulation, chart, or other 
document. 
(23) It shall be the duty of all public officers, their deputies, 
assistants, clerks, subordinates and employees to render and fur-
nish to the attorney general, his deputy or other designated repre-
sentatives when so requested, all information and assistance in 
their possession or within their power. 
(24) Any officer participating in such inquiry and any person 
examined as a witness upon such inquiry who shall willfully dis-
close to any person other than the attorney general the name of 
any witness examined or any other information obtained upon such 
inquiry, except as so directed by the attorney general shall be 
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for 
not more than one year, or both. 
(25) The enumeration and specification of various processes 
do not preclude or limit the use of processes under the Hawaii 
Rules of Civil Procedure but are deemed to be supplementary to 
said rules or the use of any other lawful investigative methods 
which are available. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 48-105 (1947) 
All the books of record and papers of every corporation, joint 
stock company, or other association, engaged in business within 
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this state shall be subject to inspection by the attorney general 
of this state, or by any agent he may designate for that purpose, 
and such corporation, joint stock company, or other association 
shall, at such times as he shall prescribe, make such returns 
duly verified by an officer of such corporation, joint stock com-
pany or association, as shall be by him prescribed either by 
general regulations or by special direction [1911, ch. 215, § 5, p. 
688]. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 50-153 (1949) 
Whenever the attorney general or assistant attorney general 
shall have knowledge of any violation of any of the provisions of 
any of the laws of the state of Kansas relating to trusts, monop-
olies, combinations in restraint of trade, unlawful discrimination, 
unfair trade or the unlawful buying, selling and dealing in commo-
dities without the intention of delivering the same, * * * 
*** Such subpoenas may direct witnesses to bring with them any 
papers, documents and books that may be considered material, and 
may be served by any person and shall be served and returned to 
said attorney general, assistant attorney general or justice of the 
peace or judge, as the case may be, * * * (L. 1919, ch. 316, § 1). 
La. Rev. Stat. § 51.143 (1950) 
The Attorney General or district attorney acting under him, 
or the governor, before beginning an action under this Part may 
present to the court a written application for an order directing 
any person, as the Attorney General or district attorney requires, 
to appear before any judge, clerk of court, or notary public desig-
nated in the order, and answer relevant and material questions 
put to him concerning any illegal contract, combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, or to create a mono-
poly under this Part, * * * 
La. Rev. Stat § 51.144 (1950) 
144. Discovery; order; production of books, papers, etc. 
The order for examination shall be signed by the judge making 
it, and the service of a copy with an endorsement signed by the 
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Attorney General or district attorney that the person named shall 
appear and be examined*** 
The endorsement may require the person to produce on ex-
amination all books, papers and documents in his possession or 
under his control, relating to the subject of such examination * * * 
(Source: Acts 1915, Ex. Sess., No. 12 § 2.) 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 137, §48 (1954) 
The attorney general upon his own initiative * * * shall inves-
tigate * * * all contracts, combinations of conspiracies in restraint 
of trade or commerce, and all monopolies, and may require * * * 
the production of books and papers before him relating to any such 
matter under investigation * * *. 
Miss. Code Ann. § 1104 (1956) 
Sec. 1104. The state or any person, natural or artificial, in 
the manner and in such instances as now provided by law shall 
always have the right to investigate the books, records and ac-
counts of all corporations created by it and of all corporations 
doing business in this state, but this right shall not be exercised 
further than to examine books, records and accounts made and 
kept within three years next preceding the beginning of the exami-
nation thereof, unless an examination of books, records and ac-
counts made before that time be necessary to an understanding 
of the books, records and accounts made within said three years. 
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 416.310 (1949) 
Whenever the attorney general deems it necessary or proper 
before beginning any action or proceeding against any pool, trust, 
conspiracy or combination made, arranged, agreed upon or entered 
into whereby a monopoly in the manufacture, production or sale in 
this state of any article or commodity is or may be sought to be 
created, established or maintained, or whereby competition in this 
state in the supply or price of any article of commodity is or may 
be restrained or prevented, then in such case the attorney general 
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may present to any justice of the supreme court an application in 
writing, for an order directing such persons, as the attorney general 
may require, to appear before a justice of the supreme court * * * 
* * * Such endorsement may contain a clause requ1rmg such 
person to produce on such examination all books, papers and docu-
ments in his possesion or under his control relating to the subject 
of such examination; * * * 
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-1108 (1947) 
If complaint shall be made to the attorney general that any 
corporation is guilty of unfair discrimination, as defined by this 
act, he shall forthwith investigate such complaint, and for that 
purpose he shall subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, take tes-
timony, and require the production of books or other documents,*** 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-804 (1960) 
The Attorney General of this state * * * may especially re-
quire any such corporation, joint stock company or other associa-
tion, to give a list of all contracts or transactions entered into 
within the twelve months preceding such requisition, * * * 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-807 (1960): 
All the books of record and papers of every such corporation, 
joint stock company or other association engaged in business with-
in this stat.e, shall be subject to inspection by the Attorney General 
of this state, or by any agent he may designate for that purpose,*** 
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 343 
Whenever it shall appear to the attorney general, either upon 
complaint or otherwise, that any person or persons, partnership, 
corporation, company, trust or association shall have engaged in 
or engages in or is about to engage in any act or practice by this 
article prohibited or declared to be illegal, 
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The attorney general, his deputy, assistant, or other officer 
designated by him, is empowered to subpoena witnesses, compel 
their attendance, examine them under oath before himself or a 
magistrate, a court of record or a judge or justice thereof, and 
require the production of any books, or papers which he deems 
relevant or material to the inquiry. * * * 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-9 (1960) 
The Attorney General of the State of North Carolina shall 
have power, and it shall be his duty, to investigate, from time to 
time, the affairs of all corporations doing business in this State, 
which are or may be embraced within the meaning of the statutes 
of this State defining and denouncing trusts and combinations 
against trade and commerce, * * * 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-10 (1960) 
In performing the duty required in § 75-9, the Attorney Gen-
eral shall have power, at any and all times, to require the officers, 
agents or employees of any such corporation, and all other per-
sons having knowledge with respect to the matters and affairs of 
such corporations, to submit themselves to examination by him, 
and produce for his inspection any of the books and papers of any 
such corporations, or which are in any way connected with the 
business thereof; * * * 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 79, § 82 (1951) 
If complaint shall be made to the Attorney General that any 
corporation is guilty of unfair discrimination, as defined by this 
act (Sections 81-87 of this title), he shall investigate such com-
plaint and for that purpose he may subpoena witnesses, administer 
oaths, take testimony, and require the production of books or other 
documents, * * * 
S.C. Code § 66-112 (1952) 
Whenever the Attorney General has determined to commence 
an action or proceeding under any law relating to the prohibition 
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or prevention of trusts, combinations or monopolies or against any 
corporation, foreign or domestic, for any violation of any law, he 
may present to any justice of the Supreme Court or any circuit 
judge, either before or after beginning such action * * * in such 
order and answer such questions as may be put to them or to any 
of them and produce such papers, documents and books concerning 
any alleged illegal contract, arrangement, agreement, trust, mono-
poly or combination or corporate acts in violation of law * * * 
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 7439 (1948) 
Upon the application of the Attorney General, or of any of his 
assistants, or of any district or county attorney, acting under the 
direction of the Attorney General made to any country judge or any 
justice of the peace in this State, stating that he has reason to be-
lieve * * * knows of a violation of any provision of the preceding 
subdivision, it shall be the duty of such county judge or justice to 
have summoned as in criminal cases and to have examined such 
witness in relation to violations of any provision of said subdivi-
sion*** 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-58-3 (1953) 
If complaint is made to the attorney general that any corpora-
tion is guilty of unfair discrimination as defined by the preceding 
section, he shall investigate such complaint, and for that purpose 
he may subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, and 
require the production of books or other documents, * * * 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.110 (1961) 
(1) Whenever the attorney general believes that any person 
may be in possession, custody, or control of any original or copy 
of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper, communication, 
tabulation, map, chart, photograph, mechanical transcription, or 
other tangible document or recording, wherever situated, which he 
believes to be relevant to the subject matter of an investigation of 
a possible violation of sections 3, 4, 5 or 6 of this act, he may, 
prior to the institution of a civil proceeding thereon, execute in 
writing and cause to be served upon such a person, a civil inves-
tigative demand requiring such person to produce such documentary 
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material and permit inspection and copying: PROVIDED, That 
this section shall not be applicable to criminal prosecutions. 
(2) Each such demand shall: 
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(a) State the statute and section or sections thereof, the 
alleged violation of which is under investigation, and the 
general subject matter of the investigation; 
(b) Describe the class or classes of documentary material 
to be produced thereunder with reasonable specificity so as 
fairly to indicate the material demand; 
(c) Prescribe a return date within which the documentary 
material is to be produced; and 
(d) Identify the members of the attorney general's staff 
to whom such documentary material is to be made for in-
spection and copying. 
(3) No such demand shall: 
(a) Contain any requirement which would be unreasonable 
or improper if contained in a subpoena duces tecum issued 
by a court of this state; or 
(b) Require the disclosure of any documentary material 
which would be privileged or which for any other reason 
would not be required by a subpoena duces tecum issued 
by a court of this state. 
(4) Service of any such demand may be made by: 
(a) Delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the person 
to be served, or, if such person is not a natural person, to 
any officer of the person to be served; or 
(b) Delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the princi-
pal place of business in this state of the person to be served; 
or 
(c) Mailing by registered or certified mail a duly executed 
copy thereof addressed to the person to be served at the 
principal place of business in this state, or, if said person 
has no place of business in this state, to his principal office 
or place of business. 
(5) Documentary material demanded pursuant to the prov1s1ons 
of this section shall be produced for inspection and copying during 
normal business hours at the principal office or place of business 
of the person served, or at such other times and places as may 
be agreed upon by the person served and the attorney general. 
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(6) No documentary material produced pursuant to a demand, 
or copies thereof, shall, unless otherwise ordered by a superior 
court for good cause shown, be produced for inspection or copying 
by, nor shall the contents thereof be disclosed to, other than an 
authorized employee of the attorney general, without the consent 
of the person who produced such material: PROVIDED, That, 
under such reasonable terms and conditions as the attorney gen-
eral shall prescribe, the copies of such documentary material 
shall be available for inspection and copying by the person who 
produced such material or any duly authorized representative of 
such person. The attorney general or any assistant attorney 
general may use such copies of documentary material as he de-
termined necessary in the enforcement of this act, including pre-
sentation before any court: PROVIDED, That any such material 
which contains trade secrets shall not be presented except with 
the approval of the court in which action is pending after adequate 
notice to the person furnishing such material. 
(7) At any time before the return date specified in the demand, 
or within twenty days after the demand has been served, which-
ever period is shorter, a petition to extend the return date for, 
or to modify or set aside a demand issued pursuant to subsection 
(1), stating good cause, may be filed in the superior court for 
Thurston County, or in such other county where the parties re-
side. A petition, by the person on whom the demand is served, 
stating good cause, to require the attorney general or any person 
to perform any duty imposed by the provisions of this section, 
and all other petitions in connection with a demand, may be filed 
in the superior court for Thurston County, or in the county where 
the parties reside. 
(8) A person upon whom a demand is served pursuant to the 
provisions of this section shall comply with the terms thereof 
unless otherwise privided by order of court issued under subsec-
tion (7) hereof. Any person who, with intent to avoid, evade or 
prevent compliance, in whole or in part, with any civil investiga-
tive demand under this section, removes from any place, conceals, 
withholds, or destroys, mutilates, alters, or by any other means 
falsifies any documentary material in the possession, custody, or 
control of any person which is the subject of any demand duly 
served upon any per son shall be guilty of an offense against the 
state, and shall be subject, upon conviction, to a fine not to exceed 
five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term of not more 
than one year, or both. 
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Wis. Stat. Ann. § 133.06 (1957) 
(1) Whenever the attorney-general files with any circuit court 
commissioner a statement that he has reason to believe and does 
believe that a contract, agreement, combination, trust or conspir-
acy in restraint of trade as defined by section 133.01 or 133.21 
exists or that a violation of either of said sections has occurred 
said commissioner shall issue his subpoena for the persons re-
quested by the attorney-general. * * * 
(2) The testimony shall be taken by a stenographic reporter,*** 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 133.22 (1957) 
Whenever the attorney general shall be notified or have reason 
to believe that any such corporation has violated any provision of 
section 133.21 it shall be his duty forthwith to address to any such 
corporation or to any director or officer thereof such inquiries as 
he may deem necessary for the purpose of determining whether or 
not such corporation has violated any provision of said section, and 
it shall be the duty of such corporation, director or officer so ad-
dressed to promptly and fully answer in writing, under oath, such 
inquiries; * * * 
APPENDIXD 
PROPOSED MODEL ACT PROVISION* 
Section 9. Civil investigative demand. 
(a) Whenever the Attorney General believes that any person 
may be in possession, custody, or control of any original or copy 
of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper communication, 
tabulation, map, chart, photograph, mechanical transcription, or 
other tangible document or recording, wherever situate, which he 
believes to be relevant to the subject matter of an investigation 
of a possible antitrust violation, he may, prior or subsequent to 
the institution of a civil proceeding thereon, execute in writing 
and cause to be served upon such person a civil investigative de-
mand requiring such person to produce such documentary material 
and permit inspection and copying. 
(b) Each such demand shall-
(1) State the statute and section or sections thereof alleged 
violation of which is under investigation, and the general 
subject matter of the investigation; 
(2) Describe the class or classes of documentary material 
to be produced thereunder with reasonable specificity so as 
fairly to indicate the material demanded; 
(3) Prescribe a return date within which the documentary 
material is to be produced; and 
(4) Identify the state employees or representatives to whom 
such documentary material is to be made available for in-
spection and copying. 
(c) No such demand shall require the production of any docu-
mentary material which would be privileged from disclosure if de-
manded by a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of this state 
in aid of a grand jury investigation of such alleged violation. 
(d) Any such demand may be served by any attorney employed 
by or other authorized employee of this state. Service of any such 
demand may be made by-
* Stern, "Text and Commentary on a Draft Statute," 39 Texas L. Rev. 723 
(1961). 
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(l} Delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the person 
to be served, or, if such person is not a natural person, to 
any officer of the person to be served; or 
(2) Delivering a duly executed copy thereof to any place 
of business in this state of the person to be served; or 
(3) Mailing by registered or certified mail a duly executed 
copy thereof addressed to the person to be served at any 
place of business in this state, or, if said person has no 
place of business in this state, to his principal office or 
place of business. 
(e} Documentary material demanded pursuant to the prov1s10ns 
of this section shall be produced for inspection and copying during 
normal business hours at the principal office or place of business 
of the person served, or at such other times and places as may 
be agreed upon by the person served and any authorized employee 
or representative of the state. In lieu of having such material 
copies by an employee or representative of this state, the Attorney 
General may require the person served to furnish copies of the 
material, the reasonable expense of which shall be borne by the 
office of the Attorney General. 
(f} When documentary material produced pursuant to a demand 
is no longer required for use in connection with the investigation 
for which it was demanded, or in any case or proceeding resulting 
therefrom, or at the end of eighteen months following the date when 
such material was produced, whichever is the sooner, the person 
served with such demand shall be relieved of the duty to hold such 
documentary material available for inspection and copying as re-
quired by sub-section (a}: Provided, however, that any court in 
which a petition may be filed as set forth in sub-section (h} hereof 
may, upon good cause shown, extend such period of eighteen months, 
but no one of such extensions may exceed eighteen months in dura-
tion. 
(g} The Attorney General or any other authorized employee of 
the state may use documentary material produced pursuant to a 
demand, or copies thereof, as he determines necessary in the per-
formance of his official duties in connection with this act, including 
presentation of any case or proceeding under this act before any 
court or grand jury. In no other connection shall such material 
or copies be produced for inspection or copying by, nor shall the 
contents be produced for inspection or copying by, nor shall the 
contents thereof be disclosed to, other than an authorized employee 
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of the state, without the consent of the person which produced such 
material, unless otherwise ordered by a Superior Court [ or insert 
name of state court of general jurisdiction] for good cause shown. 
Material or copies shall be available for inspection and copying by 
the person who produced such material or any duly authorized rep-
resentative of such person, under such reasonable terms and con-
ditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe. 
(h) At any time before the return date specified in the demand, 
or within twenty days after the demand has been served, whichever 
period is shorter, a petition to extend the return date for, or to 
modify or set aside a demand issued pursuant to sub-section (a), 
stating good cause, may be filed in the Superior Court [ or insert 
name of state court of general jurisdiction] for [insert name of 
county in which state capital is located] County, or in such other 
county as the parties may agree. "Good cause" to modify or set 
aside a demand may be shown only, except in extraordinary cir-
cumstances, by failure of the Attorney General to comply with sub-
sections (b) or (c) hereof. A petition, stating good cause, to re-
quire the Attorney General or any person to perform any duty im-
posed by the provisions of this section, and all other petitions in 
connection with a demand, may be filed in the Superior Court [ or 
insert name of state court of general jurisdiction] for [insert name 
of county in which state capital is located] County, or in such other 
county as the parties may agree. 
(i) A person upon whom a demand is served pursuant to the 
provisions of this section shall comply with the terms thereof un-
less otherwise provided by an order of court issued under sub-
section (h) hereof. Any person who, with intent to avoid, evade, 
prevent, or obstruct compliance, in whole or in part, with any 
civil investigative demand under this section, (1) removes from 
any place, (2) conceals, (3) withholds, or (4) destroys, mutilates, 
alters, or by any other means falsifies, any documentary material 
in the possession, custody, or control of any person which is the 
subject of any demand duly served upon any person, or who (5) 
otherwise willfully disobeys any such demand, shall be guilty of 
an offense against the State, and shall be subject, upon conviction 
in any court of competent jurisdiction, to a fine not to exceed 
$5,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years, 
or both. Failure of the state to serve the demand properly pursu-
ant to subsection (d) hereof shall be a defense to prosecution under 
this subsection, but invalidity of the demand under subsections (b) 
and (c) shall not be a defense, and such invalidity may be tested 
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only in an action under subsection (h) to modify or set aside the 
demand. 
(j) Nothing contained in this section shall impair the authority 
of the Attorney General or any authorized state attorney to (1) lay 
before any grand jury impanelled before any Superior Court [ or 
insert name of state court of general jurisdiction] of this state 
any evidence concerning any alleged antitrust violation, (2) invoke 
the power of any such court to compel the production of any evi-
dence before any such grand jury, (3) file a civil complaint or 
criminal information alleging an antitrust violation which is not 
described in the demand, or (4) institute any proceeding for the 
enforcement of any order or process issued in execution of such 
power, or for the punishment of any organization or individual for 
disobedience of any such order or process. 
APPENDIXE 
QUESTIONNAIRE: DISCOVERY IN STATE ANTITRUST 
The following questions were propounded to the attorney 
general's offices of each of the fifty states: 
(1) What discovery techniques are available in state anti-
trust and restraint of trade investigations in your state? 
(2) What use is made of these techniques, i.e., how active 
is your state at present in this area? 
(3) What problems, if any, do you see in present discovery 
procedures in this area? 
(4) Are there any additional procedures you would like to 
see inaugurated in your state ? Why? 
The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to the 
forty-five states which replied to the questionnaire. The results 
are summarized as follows: 
1) Alabama: Antitrust law contained in title 57, sections 106-108, 
Code of Alabama, as recompiled 1958. Broad subpoena power of 
attorney general, not confined to antitrust contained in title 13, 
section 229 (2)(b), and title 55, section 235. 
2) Alaska: No antitrust law, but actions possible under common 
law. Discovery laws closely patterned on Federal Rules. An anti-
trust law was introduced in last two sessions of legislature (pat-
terned on new Washington law). Only a few complaints received 
thus far. Civil remedies by private parties encouraged. 
3) Arizona: Discovery procedures same as Federal Rules. State 
not presently active. 
4) Arkansas: Antitrust laws contained in title 70 of Arkansas 
Statutes of 1947 Annotated. Deposition and discovery statutes 
contained in chapter 3 (sections 28-301 through 28-361). These 
are modeled after Federal Rules. No actions in present admini-
stration, and few actions at any time. Arkansas mainly an agri-
cultural state. 
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5) California: The attorney general is authorized by Government 
Code section 11180 et seq. to make investigations concerning all 
matters within his jurisdiction. He is expressly empowered to 
subpoena witnesses, take testimony under oath (with or without 
a public hearing), and to compel the production of documents by 
subpoena duces tecum. In 1961 the Supreme Court of California 
had its first occasion to interpret these statutory provisions in 
Brovelli v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 524. Where voluntary ac-
cess to records and witnesses is denied, full reliance is placed 
upon the administrative investigation powers conferred by the 
above statutes. Such were utilized in all eleven of the cases filed 
in the past three years and in the cases now pending. Ideally, a 
broad visitorial power over corporations such as is embodied in 
the Texas law is thought desirable. Such would be more expedi-
tious in obtaining access to records and documentary evidence 
than the subpoena duces tecum. The California Government Code 
(11181) specifically authorizes in the inspection of records. To 
date, however, a summary demand has not been devised to utilize 
this power, which has no sanctions. The only recourse against 
a refusal would be to the courts for a writ of mandate. 
6) Colorado: The Colorado Restraint of Trade Act was not enacted 
until 1957, with no actions instituted under it as yet. A remedy by 
injunction is provided as well as criminal proceedings by indict-
ment. No discovery procedures available in criminal actions. As 
to a civil action for injunction, the ordinary discovery procedures 
of the state (modeled after the Federal Rules) are available. 
7) Connecticut: The antitrust statute is section 53-310. The sta-
tute is penal in nature, and discovery procedures are thus con-
fined. 
8) Delaware: No answer. 
9) Florida: Section 542.11, Florida Statutes, provides for the is-
suance of witness subpoenas directed to persons who are able to 
testify as to any violations of Florida's restraint of trade laws. 
Rules 1.21 through 1.34, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing 
with discovery in actions at law and equity, are also available. 
Both the attorney general's office and the local district attorneys 
make use of these procedures where necessary. A problem per-
sists in the fact that the subpoena power provided in section 542.11, 
and the limited right to take depositions prior to the commence-
ment of an action, apply only after the action has been commenced. 
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An aid to effective enforcement would appear to be that the en-
forcing official should have the authority to demand the production 
of books and records along with the giving of testimony during the 
investigatory stages of any litigation, upon his request, without the 
necessity of granting immunity as is the case under section 542.11, 
Florida Statutes. 
10) Georgia: Both constitutional and statutory prov1s1ons exist 
declaring contracts in restraint of trade to be illegal. The Georgia 
Code provision, section 20- 504 (4253), declares such contracts to 
be unenforceable, but no criminal provisions persist. Investigation 
and discovery powers for violation of state laws are given to the 
solicitors general of the several judicial circuits of the state and 
to the attorney general. No monopoly laws exist in the state, al-
though the constitution may so imply. The state's fair trade acts 
have been declared unconstitutional. 
11) Hawaii: The State Antitrust Law was put into effect on July 
24, 1961. The application of the act has thus far been keyed to 
exploratory investigative matters. No formal actions have been 
filed to date (July 31, 1962). Voluntary cooperation has been forth-
coming from those under investigation. The discovery procedures 
available are as follows: 1) issue in writing an investigative de-
mand for documentary materials, objects and tangible things; 2) 
issue in writing an investigative demand for information (written 
interrogatory); 3) subpoena a person to appear before a district 
magistrate to give oral testimony under oath; 4) request a sub-
poena duces tecum to be issued to a person under like conditions 
as stated in the case of a subpoena; 5) employ process under the 
Hawaiian Rules of Civil Procedure (similar to the Federal Rules); 
6) interview on voluntary compliance. 
12) Idaho: Both antitrust and antiprice discrimination acts exist, 
but very little activity has been forthcoming under them. The 
attorney general possesses visitorial powers over company records 
(Section 48-106). In relation to court actions, Idaho has adopted 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the discovery procedures 
so provided thus become available. 
13) Illinois: The only discovery or informative techniques available 
are the ones which normally accompany a grand jury proceeding, 
where the action is of a criminal nature; or the civil discovery 
techniques where that is the nature of the action taken. No pro-
cedures are available prior to the commencement of an action. 
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14) Indiana: No investigation and discovery procedures exist with-
in the office of the attorney general. The discovery techniques in 
Indiana are: 1) petition for and on discovery; 2) depositions, in-
terrogatories, and affidavits to perpetuate testimony. The state is 
not presently engaged or involved in any antitrust cases (August 1, 
1962). Also available are inquisitorial investigations by subcom-
mittees of the house and senate or commissioners appointed by 
the governor. 
15) Iowa: The state has an unfair discrimination statute. No 
person may be excused from testifying because of self-incrimina-
tion (section 622.15), but he shall be given immunity re criminal 
prosecutions (section 622.16). (Answer was limited by state law 
prohibiting the office from giving opinions to anyone but state 
officers). 
16) Kansas: The state has been particularly active in the milk 
pricing area. Broad subpoena powers inhere in the attorney gen-
eral (both of persons and of records, section 50-153, Kansas Sta-
tutes), which he in turn may delegate to county attorneys. An im-
munity statute exists. (section 50-156). 
17) Kentucky: No antitrust law, and the attorney general's office 
has no investigatory functions to perform. The office is consider-
ing proposing a statute on the Hawaiian model. Discovery techni-
ques are those applicable to all categories of cases as provided 
in the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26.01 - 37 .06, and 
the new Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7 .22. The office co-
operates with the Consumer Protection Committee of the National 
Association of Attorneys General and the United States Attorney 
General in his identical bid reporting system. 
18) Louisiana: The state in inactive. Though discovery proce-
dures are available (R.S. 51:140 through 152), they have not in re-
cent years been utilized. 
19) Maine: The Federal Rules have been adopted with minor 
modifications. Two special investigators are employed by the 
attorney general's office, and these do work on antitrust matters. 
The antitrust actions of the state, however, have been in the fed-
eral courts for violations of the Sherman Act. (On Maine proce-
dures, see speech contained in Summary of National Conference on 
Antitrust Problems and Consumer and Investor Protection 39 (1961), 
prepared by the Council of State Governments.) A principal problem 
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is that the private litigant is so dependent upon investigations con-
ducted by the Department of Justice. It can't release the results 
of all its investigations. For this reason, the private litigant is 
dependent upon information made public through answers to deposi-
tions, etc. 
20) Maryland: No antitrust law. A bill was introduced in 1959, 
but no action was taken on it. 
21) Massachusetts: No answer. 
22) Michigan: In discovery in state actions, resort to federal 
courts was necessary because of inadequate state investigatory 
machinery. The new Code of Civil Procedure should rectify this, 
but attorney general should be given the subpoena power. Also, 
federal assistance is required due to inadequacies in state inves-
tigations attributable to insufficient funds, etc. 
23) Minnesota: No discovery powers except as exist under the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, which are nearly identical to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The attorney general's 
office has a trained investigator who spends about 1/3 of his time 
on investigation of antitrust matters. Also, an attorney assigned 
to antitrust does some investigation. A Civil Investigative Demand 
Bill (such as federal model) would be desirable. The attorney 
general's inability to obtain books and records, or the testimony 
of reluctant witnesses, prior to the institution of suit, represents 
the most formidable obstacle to antitrust enforcement. 
24) Mississippi: Not active. 
25) Missouri: Section 416.310, RSMo 1959, provides that at the 
instance of the attorney general and prior to his commencement 
of any action to enforce the Missouri antitrust laws, an order may 
be issued by a justice of the supreme court requiring named per-
sons to appear before a justice of the supreme court or any desi-
nated examiner and answer questions of the attorney general re-
lating to a conspiracy, pool, trust, etc. The order may be granted 
with or without notice. Production of any relevant books and rec-
ords may be provided. Section 416.320. No witness may refuse 
to testify or produce any documents, but he is thereafter immune 
to prosecution or action for penalty or forfeiture as to those things 
about which he testifies or produces books, etc. Section 416.330. 
After the institution of any proceeding to enforce the antitrust laws, 
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the attorney general may take depositions and the procedure is 
substantially the same as in any other case. Section 416.370. 
However, deposing a witness grants him immunity as above. 
Section 416.400. Quo warranto proceedings against six fabrica-
tors of bridge steel were recently initiated as a result of their 
conspiratorial price fixing in sales to the state. The grant of 
immunity is a mixed blessing in the sense that corporations from 
which one would normally want information are the ones that would 
normally be the prime candidates for the role of defendant or re-
spondent. Also, if it were later determined that one of the wit-
nesses in the discovery proceedings was an active participant in 
the trust, he would become immune at least from any state crimi-
nal action or civil proceeding for treble damages. An additional 
procedure which might prove helpful would be authorization of the 
attorney general to present such cases to the grand jury. The 
only way he can now get to the grand jury in Missouri is upon re-
quest of a county prosecutor and order of the governor. The 
broad investigative powers of the grand juries and the secrecy of 
the proceedings (with the standard protections currently afforded 
persons who are the subjects of such investigations) would be of 
great assistance in the preparation of criminal cases. 
26) Montana: Recently Montana adopted new rules of civil pro-
cedure patterned after the Federal Rules. These are almost iden-
tical to Federal Rules 33 to 37 inclusive. (Section 94-7209, Rev. 
Code of 1947 provides that the rules of evidence in civil action are 
also applicable to criminal actions.) No actions have yet been 
commenced (i.e., since the adoption of the new rules) under the 
antitrust laws. (Section 94-1104, R.C.M., 1947). 
27) Nebraska: No answer. 
28) Nevada: No antitrust law. The Federal Rules are in opera-
tion in the state. 
29) New Hampshire: No activity under the statute on Combinations 
and Monopolies (RSA 356). Civil discovery and deposition proce-
dures are available, but federal action has preempted the field of 
antitrust enforcement. 
30) New Jersey: No antitrust laws. 
31) New Mexico: The author was referred to his own library. 
(New Mexico not active). 
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32) New York: No answer. 
33) North Carolina: The attorney general possesses power to 
subpoena witnesses and conduct inquiries. While recognizing the 
need for active state enforcement, the state awaits a complaint, 
i.e., no spot surveys are conducted. 
34) North Dakota: The state is primarily agricultural and thus 
antitrust problems are de minimus. Nevertheless, the state is 
now attempting to secure antitrust legislation. 
35) Ohio: No antitrust cases for over ten years. The reasons 
are budgetary restrictions and a lack of trained personnel. No 
special discovery powers for the enforcement of antitrust laws 
now exist. View expressed that broadest investigatory and dis-
covery powers are necessary for effective enforcement. 
36) Oklahoma: Not active. Only discovery procedures of the 
attorney general's office are complaints from interested parties. 
37) Oregon: No antitrust law. But one has been proposed in the 
legislature. 
38) Pennsylvania: No antitrust law. Prior to 1961, the Common-
wealth had never instituted an antitrust action under either the 
common law or federal statute. Now, however, the state is co-
operating with the United States Attorney General's program for 
reporting identical bids in state purchasing. Also, eleven actions 
have been filed by the office on behalf of the state against the 
electrical equipment manufacturers which have engaged in bid-
rigging conspiracies in connection with state purchases. The ac-
tions are under the federal laws for treble damages. Discovery 
procedures are those of the pretrial conference provided under 
the Federal Rules. 
39) Rhode Island: Chapter 3761 of the Public Laws of 1956, and 
the case of State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R. I. 254, are recom-
mended as containing the current law of the state. 
40) South Carolina: The attorney general has power to subpoena 
witnesses when he believes the antitrust laws to have been violated. 
Records may also be ordered by application to a justice of the 
supreme court. Such is possible before or after filing of the 
action. A criminal immunity statute is included. Sections 66-111, 
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112, 113 and 115, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952. There 
are no cases interpreting the scope of the special statutory pro-
visions. 
41) South Dakota: Chapter 13.1813 of the South Dakota Code pro-
vides that in all prosecutions, hearings and proceedings under the 
antitrust statutes, no person shall be excused from testifying or 
producing records, etc., or from obeying a subpoena on grounds 
that it may tend to incriminate him. The witness then has im-
munity from prosecution. There have been no prosecutions under 
the state statutes in several years. A Sherman Act case is now 
being pursued in the federal courts, however. 
42) Tennessee: Discovery depositions provided under Code 24-1201. 
43) Texas: The Texas attorney general is granted a rather unique 
investigatory power under the "visitorial statutes," articles 1302-
5.01 to 1302-5.06, "Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Acts," Vernon's 
Annotated Civil Statutes. Thereunder, the Attorney general or any 
of his authorized representatives or assistants has the power and 
authority to examine, at any time it is deemed necessary, all books, 
records, documents, minutes, bylaws, telegrams, letters, and other 
written memorandum of any corporation doing business in Texas, 
and to copy and record any of the aforementioned which may con-
stitute evidence of a violation of the laws of the state. None of 
the instruments copied shall be made public and none of the infor-
mation so obtained will be disclosed except in the course of a legal 
proceeding to which the state is a party. The attorney general may 
also make use of the court of inquiry procedure. Under article 
7439, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, the attorney general may 
make application to any county judge ·or justice of the peace for 
a court of inquiry at any time the attorney general has reason to 
believe that there are witnesses within the jurisdiction of the court 
who have knowledge of violations of the antitrust laws of the state. 
Upon the presentation of such application, it is the duty of the 
county judge or the justice of the peace to set a date for the court 
of inquiry, and to issue subpoenas for designated witnesses who 
are required to testify regarding their knowledge of antitrust vio-
lations. The state of Texas is very active in the areas of anti-
trust investigation and enforcement. Every legitimate complaint 
received by the attorney general's office is investigated, generally 
through the "visitorial" procedure. Extensive courts of inquiry 
have been held this year (1962) in the Billie Sol Estes case, in 
the poultry industry, and in the electrical field. The Texas visitorial 
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letter does not apply to individual or partnership records. This 
appears to be the only significant limitation upon the Texas inves-
tigatory power. 
44) Utah: The discovery techniques appear in title 13, chapter 2, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and provide that the Trade 
Commission can subpoena witnesses and documents to any of its 
hearings, and that it may take depositions as provided in civil 
actions generally, and that it· may appoint agents to conduct inves-
tigation, said agents to have the same power ast the Commision is 
granted in the alorementioned Act, and may direct a representative 
to act as a special prosecutor in any proceedings or investigations. 
The use of the techniques, however, is not extensive. The state 
is active in attempting to enforce provisions of the Unfair Prac-
tices Act (13-5-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended). The 
Fair Trade Act was declared unconstitutional. The state antitrust 
law ts criminal law and leaves it up to the district attorneys to 
gain their evidence through the usual criminal procedural methods. 
45) Vermont: No antitrust law. 
46) Virginia: The Virginia Antitrust Law is found in chapter 3, 
title 59, Code of Virginia, as amended, sections 59-20 through 
59- 40; also sections 38.1-52 and 38.1-58 through 38.1- 62 of such 
Code. No special discovery procedures obtain. State is not active. 
47) Washington: Discovery techniques available include: (1) All 
those in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) All those contained 
in the Washington Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure (pat-
terned alter the Federal Rules}: (a} Depositions on oral examina-
tion (Rules 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32; also see chapter 5.56 RCW com-
pelling the attendance of witnesses}; (b) Depositions upon written 
interrogatories (Rule 31); (c) Interrogatories to parties (Rule 33); 
(d) Production of documents and things (Rule 34 and RCW 5.56.030; 
chapter 5.46 RCW.); (e) Physical and mental examinations (Rule 35). 
The state of Washington has been moderately active in antitrust 
investigations. Eighteen &"1.lits have been filed in the federal courts 
for violations of the federal laws (against the electrical equipment 
manufacturers). Projected damages run in the vicinity of $58,000,000, 
Under the state antitrust statute (chapter 216, Laws of 1961), two 
suits have been filed against the Washington State Bowling Proprie-
tors Association, and certain officers of the association. Precom-
plaint investigative demands have been served in ten instances: 
two against a publishing company, and the remainder against certain 
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jobbers and retailers of a major oil company. The civil investi-
gative demand has proved most useful in precomplaint investiga-
tions. Since the discovery technique is relatively new in the state, 
no litigation relative to the use of the demand has as yet occurred, 
nor has the demand been challeged (Nov. 5, 1962). Staff and budget 
limitations are indicated. On the new Civil Investigative Demand 
Bill, see Howe, "Recent Antitrust Developments: Civil Investigative 
Demand-Needed Weapon or Undue Power for Prosecuting Agen-
cies," 37 Wash. L. Rev. 278 (1961). 
48) West Virginia: No Answer. 
49) Wisconsin: The state is relatively active with one full-time 
man, one half-time man and two investigators. In addition, a state 
department of agriculture exercises jurisdiction similar to that of 
the Federal Trade Commission. Of suits brought this year, four 
have been completed, and eight are in progress. Seventeen others 
are now pending. (April 3, 1962). Although most of the suits are 
civil in nature, the attorney general has brought a number of crimi-
nal proceedings. The state has broad powers over domestic cor-
porations and can readily obtain necessary information. There is 
less power over foreign corporations, but failure to answer inter-
rogatories may result in ouster. In cases involving price discrimi-
nation, the attorney general may issue an administrative subpoena, 
which is used often, and though strongly objected to, is complied 
with for fear of adverse publicity. In criminal prosecutions, Wis-
consin utilizes a "John Doe" proceeding, which is similar to the 
one-man grand jury. In civil investigations, the state employs an 
inquisitorial proceeding, in which anything relevant, including hear-
say, may be solicited. 
50) Wyoming: Not active. 
